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ABSTRACT 
 
Johnson & Johnson (J&J) has been viewed as a role model by many organizations for 
its successful handling of a 1982 crisis involving cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules that 
resulted in seven deaths. The public relations community applauded J&J for a swift 
response and for promptly implementing actions to prevent a similar crisis from occurring 
in the future. However more recently, J&J has become a poster child for poor crisis 
communications amidst a flood of recalls that started in November 2009. The present study 
used concepts from Coombs’ (2004) Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) and 
media framing research to develop a coding scheme for a content analysis of newspaper 
coverage surrounding the 1982 Tylenol recall as well as current recalls issued by J&J from 
November 2009 through April 2012. The samples included newspaper articles from New 
York Times and Chicago Tribune. Results showed that most of the stories in both samples 
did not evaluate J&J’s operational response or reputation overall. However, when the news 
coverage did evaluate J&J, coverage from the 1982 sample was positive and evenly 
balanced between favorable and unfavorable, compared to negative and unfavorable in the 
current sample. Additionally, when crisis type was mentioned in the coverage, the 1982 
crisis was more likely described as a victim crisis while the current crises were more likely 
described as an accident or preventable crisis. When the 1982 sample was examined for 
mentions of previous recalls there were none compared to 80.5% of the current sample 
mentioning a previous recall. The results support the tenets of SCCT, information giving 
strategies and reputation management strategies. Additionally, the results provide valuable 
iii 
 
information for crisis managers regarding the media’s inclusion or, lack thereof, 
organizations’ controlled media such as news releases. 
 Keywords: Johnson & Johnson, crisis, recall, Tylenol, McNeill Consumer Healthcare 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Rationale for Study 
 
Johnson & Johnson (J&J) has been viewed as a role model by many organizations for its 
successful response to a 1982 crisis involving cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules that resulted in seven 
deaths (Pauly & Hutchinson, 2005; Voreacos, Nussbaum, & Farrell, 2011; Birch, 1994). Although the 
tampering resulted in seven deaths, the public relations community applauded J&J for a swift crisis 
response that alerted the public of the possible danger. Additionally, J&J voluntarily issued a 
massive recall and removed all of their products from store shelves to ensure that no more people 
died from the tainted capsules. J&J also was lauded for providing superb communications that were 
timely and informative during the time of crisis. 
 It appears that J&J has now become a poster child for poor crisis communications amidst a 
flood of recalls that began in November 2009. In spite of its longstanding history and reputation for 
providing safe products to consumers, J&J has been cited repeatedly for unsafe products by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the FDA has even imposed a legal injunction against the 
organization (J&J, 2011b; U.S. Food and Drug Administration [FDA], 2011). 
Media coverage of the crisis could be a good indication of whether or not J&J’s reputation is 
being affected by the current recalls and whether or not it still holds the same esteem that it did 
after its 1982 successful handling of the Tylenol tampering.  
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According to Bond & Kirshenbaum (1998): 
A positive article in a newspaper story or prestigious magazine can often do more for a 
business than any ad can. (p. 146) 
 
The newspaper or magazine article could be more valuable to an organization than 
advertising because a third party is speaking highly of the organization instead of the organization 
paying for placement of positive information in an advertisement. This consideration is important 
because when news coverage reports on a crisis the tone of the article could have an impact on 
consumers’ perceptions of the organization. Although the present study does not focus on the 
consumer perspective and resulting behaviors and perceptions, the findings of this study could be 
useful in positing possible repercussions of negative publicity and effects of positive publicity.  
Research shows that news coverage is more likely to be negative. Negative publicity about 
companies has become prevalent in the 21st century and news outlets generally prefer to report 
negative news stories about companies, therefore it is more common for companies to receive 
negative publicity than positive publicity from the press (Dennis & Merrill, 1982; Xie & Peng, 2009). 
In the case of J&J, the organization’s swift response to the 1982 tampering likely garnered positive 
coverage. This is probably because the company initiated measures to address public safety. 
However, J&J’s responses to the more recent recalls pale in comparison to the lauded 1982 
response and could make the company an easy target for negative publicity. 
The FDA does not mandate how recalls must be communicated to the public. However, the 
FDA does monitor the strategies of organizations whose products are being recalled and ensures 
that they are using the proper tactics to inform the public. The FDA only intervenes in extreme 
cases where the organization does not alert the public of a health hazard in a timely fashion 
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(Solomon, 2009). Although organizations provide press releases about recalls to media outlets, 
most recalls are never reported in the mass media. Communication research shows that news 
media outlets generally prefer to report negative news coverage more than positive coverage, so 
when product recalls are reported in the news the reports are more likely to be negative by the 
very nature of the news business (Dennis & Merrill, 1982; Xie & Peng, 2009).  
Numerous studies show that negative press reports have long lasting impacts on the 
organizations or people that they are about (Kepplinger & Gabb, 2007; Tybout, Calder, & Sternthal, 
1981; Wyatt & Badger, 1984). Additionally, studies have shown that negative press reports and 
advertisements can negatively influence the public’s perceptions of organizations (Garramone, 
Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990). J&J’s recent series of recalls and mounting legal troubles have 
attracted media attention to the company.  
A cursory glance at media coverage regarding J&J’s recent recalls shows mixed perceptions 
regarding J&J’s response to the crises and J&J’s reputation. When J&J’s 2009 recalls began, its 
reputation was unscathed as indicated by the comment below: 
It's {J&J} in the midst of its fourth product recall in a year and is the subject of 19 active 
federal or state investigations or lawsuits regarding its sales, marketing pricing or billing 
practices--more than three times the number of Pfizer. Yet a shiny corporate halo clings to 
Johnson & Johnson, established with its legendary handling of the 1982 Tylenol poisonings 
that has kept the company atop "most-admired" lists ever since. J&J ranked No. 4 on 
Fortune's list of most-admired companies in March and, in a new survey by the Reputation 
Institute last month, was cited as the most-reputable company in the U.S. (Neff, 2010, p. 1) 
As J&J’s recall woes continued, the same journalist acknowledged how J&Js numerous 
recalls appear to be affecting the brand one year later. 
The seemingly unending series of product recalls that has rocked Johnson & Johnson has 
cost it $1 billion in lost wholesale sales due to production shutdowns. But that's just the 
beginning: It's tipped off a cascade of consequences including sliding market share, 
dwindling ad budgets, lost shelf space and an incalculable blow to employee morale and 
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reputation as the company fell from No. 2 in the 2010 list of Fortune Most Admired 
Companies to No. 17 this year. (Neff, 2011, p. 1) 
The fact that the same journalist wrote both of these stories illustrates why a thorough 
examination of news coverage is necessary to get a more accurate depiction of news coverage 
surrounding J&J’s recalls.  
Another point of interest is how J&J’s operational response to the crisis and its formal 
response issued to news outlets are described in the news coverage. A company’s actions following 
a recall of its products have significant effects on the consumers’ image of the company, brand 
loyalty, and purchase intentions (Souiden & Pons, 2009).  
Therefore, the present study employs the content analysis research method to examine 
news coverage from the 1982 recall and the more recent recalls to describe the following: the way 
that J&J’s recalls are described in media coverage, whether or not the news coverage describes 
information giving strategies that J&J issues, whether or not the news coverage describes a 
reputational management strategy used in J&J’s formal response to the crisis and if so which one, 
and the way that the news coverage describes J&J’s overall reputation. It is crucial to evaluate 
media coverage because of the immense potential publicity has to impact people’s perceptions. This 
appraisal may be even more important in times of crisis since negative coverage is more likely to be 
covered by the news media than positive. In the case of J&J, news coverage surrounding its recent 
recalls may be more likely to contain negative elements. 
Theories related to crisis communication and media effects suggest that accounts in news 
coverage could help organizations in crisis identify key elements in the coverage and based on the 
observation also provide guidance on the possible impact the coverage can have on the perceptions 
of the organization’s publics and stakeholders. 
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Literature Review 
 
Capitalism is a predominant economic system throughout the Western world and is the 
fundamental pillar of the economic system in the United States. The capitalistic nature of the U.S. 
led to the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century, and although many scholars argue that it has 
evolved into a new form, the underlying principles still dominate today in the 21st century 
(Liodakis, 2005; Langlois 2003). 
The rise of capitalism also saw the introduction of the consumerism movement. According 
to Kotler (1972), “consumerism is a social movement seeking to augment the rights and power of 
buyers in relation to sellers” (p. 49). Throughout history there have been several stages of the 
consumerism movement that were directly related to the passage of Pure Food & Drug Act of 1906, 
the Meat Inspection Act of 1906, and the creation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 (Kotler, 
1972). Originally, the Pure Food & Drug Act was enforced by the Bureau of Chemistry in the 
Department of Agriculture, which became the FDA in 1930 (FDA, 2011). 
In 1962, President John F. Kennedy solidified consumers’ rights further in an address to 
Congress where he outlined four types of consumers’ rights: consumers’ rights to safety, 
consumers’ rights to be informed, consumers’ rights to choose, and consumers’ rights to be heard 
(Kennedy, 1962). The President also provided more funding and more personnel to the FDA. The 
FDA was and is presently responsible for enforcing manufacturing practices that result in safe food 
and drugs for consumers. Since President Kennedy first introduced the consumers’ bill of rights, 
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several presidents have also added to the rights, but the basic fundamentals have not changed 
(Lampman & Douthitt, 1997).  
Although these standards were instituted decades ago by the US government as the 
underlying principles of the FDA, it appears that there is contention among government officials, 
the FDA and drug manufacturers in the 21st century (FDA, 2007). Currently, manufacturers’ failure 
to adhere to government standards is prevalent. One of the most visible signs of these failures is in 
the volume of product recalls issued by the FDA. Each recall that is issued by the FDA represents an 
organization’s failure to meet government standards. Although there are numerous recalls posted 
on the FDA’s web site, the public is most likely to learn about recalls through mass media outlets. 
However, media outlets are not required to report on the recalls, but reserve the right to report on 
them as they so choose. In J&J’s case, key publications have reported on the recent recall flurry such 
as Bloomberg Businessweek (2011). Although this is only one example of news coverage about J&J’s 
recent recalls this example illustrates the massive number of consumers that one news report can 
reach. Businessweek has nearly one million paid subscribers and a total audience of 4.6 million 
(Bloomberg Media, 2011). The negative nature of this report is a stark contrast to the way J&J was 
lauded for its handling of a 1982 cyanide scare. 
 
 
J&J’s successful handling of the Tylenol cyanide scare 
 
J&J was well respected in the “public eye” for the way that it handled the Tylenol cyanide 
tampering in the Chicago area and the seven resulting deaths (Pauly & Hutchison, 2004). On 
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September 29, 1982, a 12 year old girl, Mary Kellerman died in Elk Grove, Illinois. The following 
timeline maps the course of events that followed Kellerman’s death (Pienciak, 1982): 
 
 
 Timeline of events. 
 
 Kellerman complains of a sore throat and her parents give her Tylenol. Her parents 
found her unconscious and less than two hours later she was dead. At first the 
suspected cause of death is a stroke, but the autopsy reveals that she died from 
cyanide poising. 
 On the same day about five miles north of Elk Grove, Adam Janus was experiencing 
mild chest pains, so he picked up a bottle of Extra Strength Tylenol on his way home 
from picking his daughter up from daycare. When Janus arrived home, he took the 
Tylenol and his wife was unable to wake him less than an hour later. Janus was 
pronounced dead a few hours later. The initial reason for Janus’ death was a blood 
clot, but an autopsy later revealed that he also had been poisoned with cyanide. 
Janus’ wife and brother were at the hospital together and returned home after the 
tragic event. Both of them were severely fatigued from the day’s events and took 
Tylenol to help. Less than two hours later paramedics had returned to work on 
Janus’ brother and his wife who also fell ill while the paramedics were there. Janus’ 
brother died the same day and his wife was later removed from life support due to 
complications from the cyanide-laced pills. 
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 About the same time that Adam Janus was dying, Mary “Lynn” Reiner took some 
Tylenol to help with pain and discomfort from the recent birth and delivery of her 
fourth child. Shortly after taking the medicine, Mrs. Reiner collapsed and later died. 
Authorities found several cyanide-laced pills in the bottle that Reiner had used. 
 The same day, Mary S. McFarland was feeling ill at work and took some Extra 
Strength Tylenol. She collapsed on the job and was rushed to a local hospital where 
she died shortly after. Authorities also found cyanide-laced pills in McFarland’s 
bottle. 
 Later in the evening on the same day, Paula Prince, an airline stewardess, took Extra 
Strength Tylenol for relief after work. Her body was discovered in her apartment a 
day later and the cause of death was cyanide poisoning.  
Seven people died over the course of three days as a result of this tampering. The person 
responsible for the tampering was never found, but J&J was absolved of any wrongdoing and 
described as the victim of product tampering. When using a 21st century lens, it may appear that J&J 
did not act swiftly enough to alert the public after the first death which allowed six other people to 
die. However, in the 1980s there was not a 24-hour news cycle and most mass communication 
occurred through daily newspapers and television broadcasts, so the word about the product 
tampering that caused the deaths did not spread as quickly as it would now.  
In the case of this crisis, J&J was a victim because the organization did not have any control 
over what happened to the pills once they had been distributed. Although J&J was not completely 
aware of the root cause of the problem, the organization immediately removed all bottles of Tylenol 
capsules from store shelves following the seven deaths (Mabey & Iles, 1994). More than 30 million 
capsules were destroyed although they were found safe. In addition to the recall, J&J also 
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established a 1-800 number for consumers to call with inquiries. The company eventually 
discovered that the capsules had been laced with cyanide by an individual, so the company was not 
directly at fault for the deaths. J&J united with industry representatives and the FDA to devise a 
plan to prevent future tampering (Hinds, 1982). Nearly two months later, Tylenol bottles returned 
to the market, with a brand new safety mechanism to prevent future tampering…tamper-resistant 
packaging, which eventually became an industry standard. 
In the first days following the initial tampering deaths, Tylenol lost 87% of its market share 
(Barton, 2001). As a result of the massive recall, J&J’s stock value decreased by 29%, which 
amounted to nearly $2.3 billion (Dowdell, Govindaraj, & Jain, 1992). Although J&J’s response was 
costly, it was guided by its credo that emphasizes placing the needs and wellbeing of consumers 
first. When the initial crisis occurred, J&J claimed that the crisis had garnered the most domestic 
news coverage of any event since the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 (Alsop, 
2004). Initial media coverage of the tampering stated that it was unlikely that the cyanide was put 
in the capsules at J&J’s plant (“5 Die After”, 1982; “Around the World”, 1982). J&J was able to 
recover most of its original market share by the end of the year due to its effective management of 
the tampering (Lewin, 1982). 
The 1982 tampering was a crisis for J&J, which can be confirmed by several 
communication scholars. An organizational crisis is “a specific, unexpected and non-routine 
organizationally based event or series of events which creates high levels of uncertainty 
and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals” (Seeger, Sellnow, & 
Ulmer, 2003, p. 7). According to Weick (1988), crises are events that are distinguished by 
low probability and high consequences that threaten an organization’s core. The low 
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probability of the occurrence requires more sensemaking on the part of the organization 
because the events that transpire are beyond normal interpretations. Sensemaking refers 
to “a developing set of ideas with explanatory possibilities, rather than a body of 
knowledge” (Weick, 1995, p. 245). This is a crucial point for organizations experiencing 
crises: 
The less adequate the sensemaking process directed at a crisis, the more likely it is that the 
crisis will get out of control. That straightforward proposition conceals a difficult dilemma 
because people think by acting. To sort out a crisis as it unfolds often requires action which 
simultaneously generates the raw material that is used for sensemaking and affects the 
unfolding crisis itself. There is a delicate tradeoff between dangerous action which produces 
understanding and safe inaction which produces confusion. (Weick, 1988, p. 305) 
In 1986, J&J faced a similar crisis involving another Tylenol tampering. From November 
2009 through April 2012 J&J experienced several crises according to the definition outlined by 
Seeger et al. J&J’s recent slew of product recalls is definitely improbable and the sustained long 
duration over which its recalls have continued to occur appears to be a rare occurrence in the 
product recall arena. Additionally, the sensemaking that J&J leaders use during this timeframe will 
be crucial to weathering the recall storm and maintaining the company’s reputation.  
According to Benson (1988), J&J responded quickly in the 1982 recall and used sound 
strategy to ensure that the organization’s messages were consistent throughout the duration of the 
product harm crisis. The professionalism and care for consumers shown by J&J during the 1982 
crisis cultivated a positive reputation among Americans that has endured into the 21st century.   
However, since December 2009, J&J has been plagued with recalls, several that even 
resulted in federal investigation and oversight. It is difficult to pinpoint a definitive date when J&J’s 
problems began, but the December 2009 voluntary recall of Tylenol Arthritis pills will be used as 
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the starting point for this study. In December of 2009, J&J received consumer complaints about a 
musty odor on some of its Tylenol pills. Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and stomach pain were the 
reported effects that were identified in the recall (Harrow, 2009). In January 2010, J&J expanded 
the recall to include several other medicines and also identified the source of the smell as a flame-
retardant chemical that was used on the pallets on which the medicine was stored (Harrow, 2009). 
J&J appeared to handle this recall well by issuing a voluntary recall, but its ensuing headache came 
from a flurry of additional recalls, most of which pointed to poor manufacturing practice and a lack 
of oversight from leadership (Weldon, 2010). 
The FDA oversees the recall process that is used as an efficient, timely and economical way 
to protect consumers rather than enter into costly judicial proceedings (FDA, 2011). The 1982 
Tylenol recall was a voluntary recall that J&J issued without being forced to do so by the FDA. 
During the 1982 recall, J&J executives were so committed to providing safe products for consumers 
that the organization instructed the public to dispose of all Tylenol capsules until they were able to 
determine the cause of the deaths. Additionally, J&J and the FDA worked together harmoniously to 
spread the word about the tampering to public and to devise a plan to ensure that it did not recur 
(McFadden, 1982). However, more recently, it appears that J&J has diverted from its credo by 
allegedly circumventing the FDA’s recall process in a phantom recall and also by providing product 
after product that has been determined unsafe by the FDA (Kavilanz, 2010). The number of recalls 
that J&J has issued since December 2009 is too numerous to list here, but a comprehensive list can 
be found in Appendix A. This series of crises has created a precarious situation from which J&J must 
recover in order to maintain its status as a trusted brand. 
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Recall procedures and effects 
 
There are three types of recalls: voluntary recalls that are initiated by an organization, those 
that are issued at the recommendation of the FDA, and those that are mandated by the FDA. 
Additionally, each type of recall can be categorized as follows: Class I, Class II, and Class III. Class I 
recalls are placed on products that are likely to cause serious adverse health effects or death. Class 
II involves products that may cause temporary medical conditions that are reversible and are highly 
unlikely to result in an adverse health effect or death. Class III recalls are reserved for products that 
will not cause any adverse health effects (Solomon, 2009). If an organization does not implement 
the procedures and strategies necessary to rectify the issues identified in the recall(s), the FDA 
reserves the right to impose more stringent penalties and even take control of the organization’s 
operations.  
In March 2011, J&J signed a consent decree with the FDA that will govern operations at 
three of the company’s plants for at least five years (J&J, 2011b). The consent decree of 
condemnation, more commonly referred to as a consent decree, is a judicial injunction that is filed 
in the US Department of Justice against a defendant (FDA, 2011). An injunction is a civil judicial 
process that aims to avert organizations from violating laws. The Office of Criminal Investigations 
(OCI) is the FDA department that oversees the injunction process and the U.S. Attorney’s Office files 
the injunctions. The OCI has very specific guidelines that are followed when the process to file an 
injunction is initiated. According to the FDA, 
An injunction may be considered for any significant out-of-compliance circumstance, but 
particularly when a health hazard has been identified...In considering an injunction, the 
agency must evaluate the seriousness of the offense, the actual or potential impact of the 
offense on the public, whether other possible actions could be as effective or more effective, 
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the need for prompt judicial action, and whether it will be able to demonstrate the 
likelihood of the continuance of the violation in the absence of a court order. (p. 27, 2011) 
 
Additionally, J&J has faced allegations of executing a “phantom recall” where J&J subsidiary, 
McNeil Consumer Healthcare, allegedly hired contractors to go into stores and retrieve all products 
from shelves without alerting consumers to potential health hazards. The House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform has held two hearings since the recalls began to investigate 
possible quality control issues in J&J plants as well as alleged corporate misdeeds (Weldon, 2010; 
Coggin, 2010). 
J&J announced the signing of the consent decree, and the press release that was issued 
made the decree sound like recognition of the organization’s good faith effort to correct the 
problems that had been identified internally (J&J, 2011b). It also made the injunction appear to be a 
supportive gesture of the FDA to aid J&J in its correction of the problems. However, in contrast, the 
FDA’s announcement regarding the signing of the decree painted J&J as a negligent organization 
that had failed to comply with federal regulations, thus resulting in the company being under the 
mandate until the FDA determined that it was no longer necessary (FDA, 2011). As J&J continues to 
try to maintain operations, it also paints a rosy picture of the consent decree for prospective 
employees in company job descriptions: 
McNeil-PPC, Inc. {J&J subsidiary} entered into a consent decree, or agreement, with the 
agency that governs certain manufacturing operations to help ensure quality and 
compliance. Now is an exciting time to join our business, as we focus on reaffirming the 
integrity of our iconic brands that are staples of households worldwide. (J&J, 2012) 
 
Numerous business scholars have cited various short term and long term effects of product 
recalls. Long term effects include declining revenue, decreasing value for shareholders, and overall 
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reputational harm to the organization. Drug recalls affect the wealth of shareholders more than 
they affect the companies that bear the actual costs of issuing and conducting the recall (Jarrell & 
Peltzman, 1985). 
One might assume that the competitors of a recalled product experience significant gains in 
market share because their competitors are facing economic and production difficulties. However, 
Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) found that all organizations that have products in the market category 
of the recalled product suffered even if they were not involved in the recalls. It has also been 
suggested that multiple media reports of the same recall result in diminished returns with 
consumers (Marsh, Schroeder, & Mintert, 2004). 
 
 
Johnson & Johnson’s legal troubles 
 
 The consent decree that J&J entered into with the FDA was not the only legal action that has 
occurred since the company’s problems began in December 2009. The company has also faced 
several lawsuits during that time. 
In January 2012, J&J agreed to pay a $158 million settlement to end a lengthy lawsuit filed 
by the Texas Attorney General charging the company’s subsidiary, Janssen, with illegally promoting 
its drug Risperdal. According to the lawsuit, J&J funded a clandestine project called the “Texas 
Mediation Algorithm Project” (TMAP) by illegally soliciting the help of state officials and academics 
to help promote the program that generated guidelines endorsing the organization’s drug. The 
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lawsuit also charged the company with overbilling Medicaid by more than $500 million (Silverman, 
2012; Citizens Commission on Human Rights International, 2012).  
In January 2012, J&J also reportedly reached a deal to pay $1 billion to end a civil 
investigation into its marketing and sales practices of Risperdan (Fisk, Feeley & Voreacos, 2012). 
Attorney generals from nearly 40 states were considering pursuing a civil investigation together 
alleging consumer fraud violations against J&J (Silverman, 2011). 
At the same time, the health care giant {J&J} disclosed that an agreement in principle was 
reached to settle a misdemeanor criminal charge related to marketing its Risperdal 
antipsychotic, but certain undisclosed issues remain open before a settlement can be 
finalized, according to the SEC filing. (Silverman, 2011, “J&J to Settle Criminal Charge,” para. 
3)  
J&J was also ordered to pay $327 million in South Carolina for deceptive marketing practices in 
June 2011, and $257.7 million in Louisiana for making misleading safety claims (Silverman, 2011). 
 
 
Johnson & Johnson’s reputation 
 
 Not only do recalls and legal proceedings of this magnitude result in financial loss, they may 
also be detrimental to an organization’s reputation. Although J&J has been plagued with recalls, it is 
still not completely clear whether or not its image and reputation have been damaged by the 
recalls. An examination of various Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rankings indicates that J&J 
has still been recognized as a good corporate citizen. J&J has been recognized as recently as 2010 
and 2011 for being a good corporate citizen in spite of its recalls (Connolly, 2011; Connor. 2010). 
The Corporate Citizen, a CSR magazine published by Boston College, recognized J&J for having the 
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highest CSR ranking in its 2010 index. This ranking was based on a CSR index, but respondents 
were lay public members who gave their opinions on organizations that were considered to have 
good CSR. It should also be noted that J&J’s rank only fell slightly in The Corporate Citizen’s 2011 
index to number 10 out of 50 companies. 
Additionally, an advisory firm, Reputation Institute in partnership with Forbes Media, 
conducted a survey of consumers that measured their good feelings towards the largest 150 
companies in the United States and J&J was among the top 10 companies (Daniels, 2011). Although 
respondents in these surveys only represent a small portion of US citizens, the rankings make J&J 
appear to be unscathed from the slew of recalls since 2009. However, in July 2011 J&J released a 
new CSR plan, “Healthy Future 2015” to perhaps re-position itself as a leader in CSR and to validate 
the recognition that it has received recently (Casey, 2011). 
J&J was also ranked number 14 in a survey of 400 patient groups who identified the most 
reputable pharmaceutical companies (Taylor, 2012). The ranks were based on a survey of 500 
influential patient groups worldwide asking them to rate pharmaceutical companies’ corporate 
reputations. The survey was conducted by PatientView.  
Although J&J’s reputation for good CSR may appear to be intact, the organization’s “bottom 
line” has suffered as a result of the recalls and consent decree. Some of the negative effects cited by 
J&J were a projected $.12 per share decrease in value and an 8.2 percent decrease in over-the-
counter drug sales in the first quarter of 2011 compared to the same time period in 2010. In 
addition, J&J reported that U.S. sales were down 26.8 percent (Food and Drug Letter, 2011). In stark 
contrast to its Top 10 finish in CSR rankings, J&J has also been recognized as one of the 10 Most 
Hated Companies in America (24/7 Wall St., 2012). The list was compiled based on consumer 
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satisfaction, customer care, product pricing, and brand impressions as well as company earnings, 
profit forecasts, and product development.  
The jury is still out on whether or not J&J’s vitality as a company will suffer from its recall 
woes. 
Looking long-term, I also don't believe that recent product recalls or negative legal results 
will significantly impair the juggernaut's prospects. J&J is trading for less than 15 times 
average earnings and free cash flow for the past five years and a dividend yield of 3.5%, and 
I continue to happily hold my shares. (Chokkavelu, 2012) 
In contrast, much criticism regarding J&J’s upper management and the organization’s poor 
manufacturing practices can be found in the trade publications as well as other mass media outlets. 
An industry blog, FiercePharma reported the following: 
Showing solidarity "across the board," a panel convened by Johnson & Johnson's board of 
directors finds top executives at both JJ [J&J] and its McNeil unit blameless in an 
embarrassing two-year stretch of product recalls. Translation: the panel threw McNeil 
middle management under the bus… McNeil suffered from "an adversarial relationship" 
between some quality-control and production staff as well as "an emphasis on production 
volume" over compliance [according to the committee]. The adversity may have developed 
during a rapid succession of McNeil leadership changes; those leaders "may not have had 
sufficient understanding of what was taking place at the plant level," the committee said. In 
addition, some equipment was outdated and insufficient. (FiercePharma, 2011) 
J&J has even been ranked number one on the Flame Index which is one assessment tool that 
uses an algorithm that pulls in data from more than 12,000 news sources and uses the news 
coverage to rank companies (Flame Index, 2012).  
The Flame Index can measure public perception for Brand Risk Management. The real-time 
data allows instant measurement of the media effect from corporate news events…Johnson 
& Johnson’s highest ranking was number 10 out of 50 on the Flame Index. Johnson & 
Johnson's rank is based on a real-time analysis of available media and information sources. 
This results in a calculation of the companies most 'on fire' in public opinion. (Flame Index, 
2012) 
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The statement and ranking are two examples of how the media has described J&J’s recent 
crises, but if the news coverage surrounding J&J’s crises is similar it could prove to be costly for the 
company. Throughout the history of mass communication research, communication scholars have 
differed in their thoughts regarding the degree that media affects the audience, but there is 
consensus that the media does have effects on the audience (Baran & Davis, 2006). Considering the 
effects that media has on audience perceptions, it is appropriate to examine media coverage 
surrounding J&J’s product recalls and legal injunctions because of the suggested part that media 
reports play in shaping the public’s perceptions. 
 
 
Effects of media coverage on public perception 
 
 McQuail (1994) proposed that mass communication as a whole is grounded on the idea that 
the media have significant effects. In general, media effects research examines the ways that media 
messages influence the perceptions and behaviors of the public. McQuail also points out the fact 
that the effects are determined just as much by the receiver as the sender. For example, framing 
research suggests that receivers will be guided by frames in the news coverage and will also 
internalize the frames and use them as they assign meaning to information and events (McQuail, 
1994). Scheufele (1999) suggested that framing can be used to contextualize media effects 
research. 
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Framing. 
  
 Gamson and Modigliani (1987) suggest that a media frame is an idea or story line that offers 
an interpretation of the meaning of events and the issues at hand. The media frame can include 
intentional or unconscious acts by the sender. This suggests that media frames can be purposely 
incorporated into media coverage by the message originator but they can also be included 
subconsciously when the sender does not intend to include them.  
 Tankard (2001) suggests that there are three metaphors that aid the understanding of 
framing metaphors. The first two metaphors relate framing to a picture frame. Firstly, Tankard 
suggests that one purpose of a frame is to isolate a portion of a picture or painting and draw 
attention to a certain part of it. Secondly, the picture frame can be used to influence the tone that 
the picture is viewed with. For example, one might view a photograph differently depending on 
how ornate or simplistic a frame is. These examples translate to the media’s ability to highlight 
certain messages or ideas and their ability to set the tone for events and stories. Lastly, Tankard’s 
final metaphor relates media framing to the frame of a house. In construction the frame is the basis 
on which the rest of the structure is built. Similarly, the news frame is the idea upon which a story’s 
organization is built. 
 Along the same lines, Entman (1993) claims, “To frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (p.52). Additionally, individual frames involve the 
internalization of ideas that individuals use to process information (Entman, 1993). While both 
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Entman’s and Tankard’s media framing concepts focus on the selection of certain concepts or ideas 
to share with the public, Entman’s perspective on media framing seems to place more emphasis on 
the intent and motive of the person who is sending the message while Tankard focuses completely 
on the medium. Entman also suggests that the receiver of the message plays an active role in the 
process. Both Entman and Tankard’s ideas are important to this study because of the suggested 
manner in which the news media’s coverage of organizations affects the public’s perception of 
those organizations. In the case of J&J’s recalls, media framing research would suggest that media 
coverage surrounding the recalls could impact: the public’s perceptions towards J&J, the amount of 
responsibility for the crisis that the public places with J&J, whether or not the public views the 
organization as guilty or innocent, and the perceived quality of the organization’s reputation. 
Media framing research suggests that the valence of media coverage has the potential to 
affect people’s perceptions of an organization in crisis. Additionally, the public’s perceptions of an 
event or object can vary depending on whether or not the publicity is negative. Therefore, the 
following research question is posed: 
Research Question 1: Was there a difference in how the media evaluated Johnson & 
Johnson’s operational response to the crisis and its overall reputation in 1982 and the 
current crises (November 2009 – April 2012)? 
The tone of media coverage can be one indication of public perception due to its potential to 
impact people’s perceptions. Thus answering this research question can provide insight for crisis 
managers on how much attention should be directed towards media outlets and how much 
credence should be given to the media reports. 
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Publicity 
 
Bond and Kirshenbaum (1998) suggest that the public generally associates more credibility 
with publicity such as news reports than with communications that are controlled by companies. 
Communication that is controlled by a company is referred to as controlled or paid media and 
includes messages that organizations have direct control over such as advertising, commercials, 
brochures, news releases and internal communication. On the contrary, uncontrolled media are 
generated by external organizations such as television, print, radio, or online publications (Owen, 
1991). When uncontrolled media report negative information, consumers weigh it more heavily 
than positive news reports (Mizerski, 1982). Dennis and Merrill (1982) suggest that media prefer to 
report negative content more than positive content. As organizations plan for future crises and 
strategize for current crises, they must consider the pervasiveness of mass communication and the 
potential of the media to cause irreparable damage to their reputations.  
 
 
Reputation 
 
Coombs and Holladay (2010), drawing upon work by Rindova and Fombrun (1999) and 
Wartick (1992), describe reputation as “the aggregate evaluation constituents make about how well 
an organization is meeting constituent expectations based on its past behaviors” (pp. 168-169). 
Gray and Balmer (2002) suggest that an organization’s success is ultimately tied to maintaining a 
good and recognizable corporate reputation. 
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 A poor corporate reputation can make building a brand difficult; however a good reputation 
does not always equal success. Consumers care most about the fairness that is shown to them by 
the organization followed by the organization’s success, and the quality of the organization’s 
leadership (Page & Fearn, 2005).  
Cable and Turban (2006) conducted a study of job seekers and identified their perceptions 
of the potential employers and examined how those perceptions affected their job searches. They 
found that job seekers base assumptions of job attributes on reputation. Additionally, they found 
that the manner in which job seekers’ perceived the organizational pride of employees is related to 
their perceived reputation of the organization. Reputations let the public know how an 
organization’s products, positions, and strategies compare to those of competing organizations 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).  
Reputation is especially important during crises (e.g., recalls), when organizations attempt 
to maintain their positive reputations in the face of potentially damaging information. It is more 
important for organizations with an existing positive reputation to respond well to crises than for 
companies who do not have good reputations. If negative publicity coincides with consumers’ 
attitudes and beliefs about an organization, then those pre-existing feelings combined with the 
publicity will determine the actual impact to the organization’s brand and reputation (Pullig, 
Netemeyer & Biswas, 2006). Thus, organizations such as J&J that have solid reputations and brand 
images should have a greater ability to “weather” crisis storms. 
Although organizations rely heavily on the media to get their messages out, they must also 
be cognizant of the fact that the only way to totally control such messaging is through advertising. 
With this in mind, one should consider how information is exchanged between the media and 
organizations with unpaid media. Without the guarantee of placement that comes with advertising, 
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organizations are left at the mercy of the media. The media have a choice whether or not to relay 
the information that the organization is sharing and they also have the liberty to communicate their 
ideas and opinions regardless of the reputation harm that may arise from the comments. Contrarily, 
news media also rely on information generators such as public relations practitioners to supply 
facts and other news content. In this way organizations act as information subsidies the media. 
According to Gandy (1982) the exchange of information between the news media and organization 
and mutually-beneficial relationship is described as: 
An attempt {by the media} to produce influence over the actions of others by controlling 
their access to and use of information relevant to those actions. The source {organization} 
causes it to be made available at something less than the cost a user would face in the 
absence of the subsidy. (p. 61) 
 
Thus, the information subsidy includes news and facts that practitioners offer to help journalists 
supplement their articles. Journalists find that it is cost effective to rely on organizations for 
information because they were not required to spend time and effort to gather information, which 
allows them to use their own resources less often and more strategically (Walters & Walters, 1992). 
When unexpected issues arise within an organization, oftentimes the problems can be 
resolved without them becoming a crisis. An organization must determine if an event is truly a 
crisis based on factors such as effects on stakeholders, effects on the bottom line, and effects on 
safety. The news media acts as an information gatekeeper by determining what information is 
worthy of space in the outlet, and what the public will deem as newsworthy (Flower, Haynes, & 
Crespin, 2003). Additionally, news media serve in a watchdog capacity to help keep the public 
abreast of information that is deemed important. The news media have occupational parameters 
24 
 
that allow them to make timely decisions about what news stories to cover. According to the 
Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics: 
Members of the Society of Professional Journalists believe that public enlightenment is the 
forerunner of justice and the foundation of democracy. The duty of the journalist is to 
further those ends by seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of 
events and issues. (Society of Professional Journalists, 2012)  
 
An organization in crisis must use strategic communication to protect the valuable asset of 
their reputation. But they also must provide the information the public needs to take action if they 
are affected by the crisis. Research in the area of crisis communication provides insights into factors 
that organizations should consider when evaluating a crisis and how the type of crisis should affect 
its communication efforts.  
 
 
Research in crisis communication 
 
Coombs’ (2004) Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) offers systematic 
guidance for organizations to follow as they develop responses to crises based on the type of crisis 
that occurs. SCCT is grounded in attribution theory which suggests that people look for underlying 
reasons that events occur because they seek to maintain a sense of control over their lives (Coombs, 
1995; Dean, 2004). To take this a step further, the discounting principle suggests that a causal 
inference will be discounted if a plausible explanation exists (Dean, 2004). For example, J&J is well 
known and highly regarded for its crisis response to the Tylenol tampering in the 1980s. However, 
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now that the government is intervening with this highly regarded company over the safety of its 
products, the discounting principle suggests that consumers will divert from their pre-existing 
perceptions of the company and hold it liable for the current safety issues. According to Coombs 
and Holladay (1996), “The more publics attribute crisis responsibility to an organization, the 
stronger the likelihood is of publics developing and acting upon negative images of the 
organization.” 
SCCT is based on the receivers’ perceptions of the crisis and on the amount of responsibility 
that they attribute to the organization. Coombs and Holladay (2002) originally identified the 
following crisis categories: natural disaster, rumors, workplace violence, product 
tampering/malevolence, challenges, technical error accidents, technical error recalls, human error 
accidents, human error recalls, and organizational misdeeds. They later reduced the categories into 
three clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable based on similar characteristics among the 
original categories. The key differentiator in each category is the amount of control that the 
organization has over the crisis. The results of Coombs and Holladay’s study also showed that the 
amount of crisis responsibility attributed to the organization increased progressively from each 
category, with the lowest responsibility attributed to the victim cluster and the highest 
responsibility attributed to the preventable cluster. Here the control element is also directly tied to 
the level of responsibility that individuals will attribute to the organization. The less control that 
the organization had over the crisis, the less responsibility individuals will attribute to the 
organization. 
The victim cluster includes crises where the organization was a victim as well as 
stakeholders and is not responsible for the crisis in any way. The accident cluster involves crises 
that were unintentional on the part of the organization such as technical failure and mechanical 
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breakdown leading to the creation of a defective product. The accident cluster crises are beyond the 
control of the organization because the breakdown was unforeseen. The preventable cluster 
involves organizations intentionally putting stakeholders at risk or acting inappropriately or 
illegally. Additionally, crises that result from human error fall in this cluster because it is possible 
that human error could have been prevented with proper training or other intervention. 
According to these definitions, J&J’s original tampering of 1982 should be categorized in the 
victim cluster because J&J was the victim of a tampering and was not at fault for what occurred. In 
contrast, several of the J&J’s current recalls would be categorized in the preventable cluster because 
J&J was found to be negligent. Additionally, J&J's apparent negligence and failure to comply with the 
FDA standards appears to be well within the organization’s control, so the crisis would meet the 
criteria for a preventable crisis according to SCCT. Therefore, the SCCT suggests that receivers 
would have increased attribution of responsibility for J&J concerning the current crises compared 
to the 1980s tampering.  
According to the situational crisis communication theory (SCCT), preventable crises have 
the potential to damage an organization’s reputation more than victim or accident crises. Therefore 
the following research question is posed: 
Research Question 2: Was there a difference in the crisis type that the news media 
described in the 1982 coverage and the current coverage (November 2009 – April 2012)? 
 
The answer to this research question pertains to the basic premises of SCCT when 
combined with the results of other research questions that address the evaluation of J&J’s 
operational response and description of J&J as an organization. Although the results will not prove 
causation they will be able to suggest possible relationships to study for future research. 
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SCCT also suggests that past crises may be used to judge organizations’ stability based on 
patterns in behavior, which is referred to as crisis history (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Stability 
refers to an event that occurs frequently and appears to be occurring in patterns, while instability is 
when a crisis happens infrequently and considered to be a rare occurrence.  
SCCT also proposes that individuals are more forgiving of unstable crises because the 
organizations involved are not “repeat offenders,” in contrast to stable crises that are viewed more 
harshly because they seem to identify underlying issues that are causing the situation to recur.  
Additionally, SCCT identifies categories that intensify the situation and further impact how 
much responsibility the public will attribute to the organization for the crisis. Those categories are: 
the severity of the crisis and the performance history of the organization (Coombs & Holladay, 
2002). Severity is represented by the actual damage done by the crisis including financial damage, 
environmental damage, and damage to human life. Performance history includes an organization’s 
response during past crises, past actions of the organization, and how the organization has treated 
stakeholders in the past. Coombs and Holladay (2002) suggest that “As severity increases or 
performance history worsens publics will attribute greater crisis responsibility to the organization” 
(p. 169).  
The current J&J crises have not resulted in loss of life, however there have been major 
implications economically for the organization and its stakeholders, which appear to be 
compounding with each recall such as the plant closures causing major reduction in overall 
production, decreased products in retail outlets, and significant judicial proceedings (Silverman, 
2011; 24/7 Wall Street, 2010). It is also possible that J&J’s handling of the current recalls and 
repeated mishandling of current crises could detract from the well established reputation of the 
organization. Additionally, since media coverage of an organization’s history of previous crises can 
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make it more difficult for the organization to repair its reputation, the following research question 
is posed: 
Research Question 3: Was there a difference in references to prior recalls in the news 
coverage of Johnson & Johnson’s 1982 recall and the current recall coverage (November 
2009 – April 2012)? 
Identifying references to previous recalls could allow the researcher to posit certain relationships 
between crisis history and attribution of responsibility when combined with the evaluative 
variables that are addressed in Research Question 1.  
 
 
Organizational response to crises 
 
According to Coombs and Holladay (2002), “An organization’s communicative response to a 
crisis can serve to limit and even to repair the reputational damage” (p. 166). There are numerous 
scholarly sources that suggest the proper organizational response to crises, but Sturges (1994) 
suggests that organizations employ three different crisis responses: instructing information, 
adjusting information and internalizing information. Internalizing information is also referred to as 
reputation management strategies and those strategies were refined as a part of SCCT. Instructing 
information tells people how to protect themselves physically and financially during a crisis. It also 
instructs the business community how to act regarding normal business operations. Adjusting 
information helps people cope psychologically with the crisis and begins to explain what is being 
done to rectify the situation and prevent it from recurring.  
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Coombs (2012) suggests that instructing and adjusting information should be at the core of 
any crisis response and that no reputation management concerns should be addressed before 
providing these information-giving strategies. These types of information are important in the 
direct aftermath of crises because people are in the information seeking stage and it is beneficial for 
the organization to provide information regarding the crisis to reassure the public that the 
organization is in control of the situation.  
Instructing information must come first because it provides information to stakeholders 
about how they can protect themselves physically & financially to prevent harm (Coombs, 2007; 
Sturges, 1994). This information is especially important during health crises, product harm, 
product recalls, natural disasters, and crises threatening public safety (Kim et al., 2011). Protection 
is crucial to prevent reputational damage, so organizations must provide information that assures 
stakeholders that the appropriate course of action is being taken to ensure protection and that the 
organization knows what transpired and how to correct the problems. This provision of 
information to stakeholders helps shape their perceptions and beliefs about the organization being 
in control of the situation (Birch, 1994). 
Adjusting information helps stakeholders cope with the psychological stress of the crisis 
(Coombs, 2007; Sturges, 1994). Adjusting information also communicates the corrective actions 
being implemented by the organization and the steps being taken to prevent a recurrence (Coombs, 
2009). According to Holladay (2009) instructing and adjusting information share common goals: 
The goals are to meet stakeholders’ needs to understand and cope with the crisis and to 
demonstrate that the organization is actively involved in managing the crisis. 
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Therefore the following research question is posed: 
Research Question 4: Was there a difference between the media’s description of Johnson & 
Johnson’s use of instructing and adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises 
(November 2009 – April 2012)? 
The results of this research question could prove to be useful to communication scholars when 
combined with the crisis type variable to see if a certain information-giving strategy appears to be 
used more often with a certain type of crisis. 
In spite of the importance of the two information giving strategies, most of the current 
communication literature focuses on reputation management rather than information-giving 
strategies (Coombs, 2009; Kim, Avery, & Lariscy, 2011; Sturges, 1994). Reputation management 
strategies are used to maintain an organization’s reputation by initiating the appropriate response 
for the crisis at hand (Coombs, 2012). These strategies communicate information to stakeholders 
that will be used to make judgments about organization’s image and reputation (Newsom & Carrell, 
1986). These strategies should be selected based on the precepts of SCCT. Although communication 
scholars have coined various names for reputation management strategies the basic concepts and 
premises are similar (Benoit & Drew, 1997). The strategies can be generally grouped into four 
categories of strategic responses: deny, diminish, rebuild, and reinforce (Coombs, 2006). The four 
categories represent a continuum ranging from strategies that are more defensive to those that are 
more accommodating. They also have varying degrees of organizational acceptance of 
responsibility for the crisis and also are geared to match the organization’s response to 
stakeholders’ degree of blame that is associated with the organization experiencing the crisis. 
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The following descriptions of the four categories were based on Benoit’s (1997) and 
Coombs’ (2006) crisis communicative strategies typology. The deny category includes statements 
that deny the occurrence or existence of the crisis or deny that the organization is the cause of the 
crisis. The diminish category includes statements that imply that although the accused organization 
is somewhat at fault for the crisis, the standards being used by accusers to evaluate the impact are 
inappropriate. Additionally, these statements may suggest that the organization should not be held 
responsible for the occurrence or impact because uncontrollable factors limited the organization’s 
ability to control the situation. The rebuild category includes statements that outline the corrective 
actions being made to rectify the situation. Organizations may also accept responsibility for the 
crisis in these statements and apologize for it. The statements may express willingness for 
remediation, rectification, and proactive works. The organization may also explain how 
organizational policies are changing in response to the crisis. The reinforce category includes 
statements that try to shift attention from the crisis by reminding stakeholders of the organization’s 
good track record by placing the crisis in a more desirable context. These statements may also 
recognize stakeholders for their continued support and understanding during the crisis. 
SCCT recommendations require organizations to match their crisis responses to features of 
the crises in order to protect them from possible reputational damage. However, this framework 
offers recommendations based on optimal matching principles designed to enhance the 
effectiveness of the response. The actual response strategies that organizations employ during 
crises may differ. Hence, there is a need to understand how organizations in crisis use reputation 
management strategies.  
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The four categories of strategic responses can be demonstrated through 14 specific 
reputation management strategies. The reputation management strategy descriptions used in the 
present research were based on a typology used by Benoit (1997) and Coombs (2006). The 
following table outlines each of the strategies: 
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Table 1 Reputation Management Strategies 
D
e
n
y
 
Attack the 
Accuser 
Confronts the person or group saying there is a crisis, claiming no crisis exists.       
Denial Asserts there is no crisis. There are two types of denial (absolute & reserved) 
Scapegoat Blames some person or group outside of the org for turning this into a crisis. Organization may 
blame a vendor or supplier for crisis. 
Suffering Claims that organization is an unfair victim of crisis 
D
im
in
is
h
 Excuse Minimizes the organization’s responsibility by denying intent to do harm to others, create a 
poor product, or damage the environment 
Deny Volition Minimizes the organization’s responsibility by claiming inability to control the events that 
triggered the crisis or by claiming that the situation was beyond the organization’s control 
Justification Minimizes the perceived damage that was caused by the crisis (i.e., “It is not as bad as it seems” 
or “It could have been worse”) 
R
e
b
u
il
d
 
Compensation The organization offers money, compensation or other gifts to the victims of the crisis 
Apology Indicates that the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis 
Repentance Asks stakeholders and victims to forgive the organization for the crisis 
Rectification Says that the organization is taking corrective action to prevent future recurrence and to 
remedy the current problem. Such corrective action could include, but is not limited to: changes 
in manufacturing, procedural changes, policy changes, personnel training. 
R
e
in
fo
rc
e
 
Bolstering Reminds stakeholders of the organization’s past good works and praises actions taken in 
response to the crisis. May also emphasize the organization’s positive attributes or positive 
actions in the past 
Transcendence Places crisis in a larger, more desirable context. Suggests a different frame of reference. Admits 
involvement in the crisis, but shows how the act advanced a greater common good 
Ingratiation Praises stakeholders by thanking them for their support. Thanks stakeholders and volunteers 
for assisting the organization and continue to show loyalty during the crisis.  
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These 14 reputation management strategies describe the common themes that 
organizations experiencing crises may employ to help maintain their reputable status. The crisis 
communicators choose which strategy is warranted based on the specific characteristics of the 
crisis at hand. This examination of reputation management strategies will provide insight into the 
extent to which SCCT’s tenets were evident in media reports of J&J’s formal responses. Therefore, 
the following research question is posed: 
Research Question 5: What reputation management strategies does the 1982 news 
coverage and current news coverage report that Johnson & Johnson used? 
 Identifying the reputation management strategies that the media reported that J&J used in 
1982 and the current crises could be helpful to scholars and practitioners. By providing insight into 
the strategies that are reported in the news in connection with certain crisis types, scholars could 
begin to posit relationships between the two. Practitioners could benefit from the results of this 
research question by seeing an example of the reputation management strategies that were 
reported in an exemplary crisis response as well as a less highly regarded one. The data could also 
allow practitioners to weigh whether or not employing certain strategies could possibly be 
detrimental to depictions of their organization’s reputation. 
 
 
Significance of Research 
 
Framing research suggests that media frames influence people’s interpretations of current 
events by emphasizing certain elements while also downplaying others. This notion is extremely 
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important to organizations that are experiencing crises because news coverage has a large impact 
on the perception, management and evolution of a crisis (Ringo, 2005).  
The literature on crisis communication demonstrates that the manner in which an 
organization handles a past crisis affects the potential for reputational harm in future crises. More 
specifically, this threat is more likely to arise in future crises resulting from intentional and 
preventable acts on the organization’s part. From this research, it appears that attribution of 
responsibility increases with the organization’s ability to prevent the crisis. Individuals are less 
willing to forgive acts that are deemed as intentional or preventable. Organizations use crisis 
response strategies to reduce reputation threats that arise from crises.  
The data gathered from this systematic approach to analyzing newspaper coverage 
surrounding Johnson & Johnson’s recalls will offer valuable insight to crisis managers. It will 
expand the existing literature on recalls by providing an in-depth comparison of an exemplary 
crisis management effort that garnered positive outcomes for the organization and a different crisis 
where the organization seemed to falter in comparison. The analysis of media coverage of the crises 
enables us to examine theoretically-based concepts and advice believed to be important for 
effective crisis management. The present study will add to existing literature by exploring how the 
newspaper coverage depicts organizations that are experiencing multiple and sustained crises over 
extended periods of times. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed the existing literature regarding media framing and crisis 
communication as well as J&J’s past and present experience during a crisis. This study seeks to 
describe media coverage surrounding J&J’s 1982 cyanide-laced Tylenol crises as well as the crises 
that the organization has experienced between December 2009 and March 2012.  Crisis 
communication and media framing literature will inform the examination of the media content. The 
following chapter discusses the research methodology that was used to address the research 
questions. 
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Chapter one provided the background, theoretical grounding, rationale and research 
questions for this study. The present chapter describes the research method used to address the 
research questions concerning crisis type, crisis history, tone, crisis response, and reputation 
management strategies described in newspaper coverage.  
 This chapter also describes the coding instrument used to examine the newspaper coverage 
and the testing of the coding instrument’s reliability. Newspaper coverage of J&J’s 1982 recall as 
well as J&J’s recalls from November 2009 – April 2012 in New York Times and Chicago Tribune was 
examined. New York Times was used because it is considered to be a prestige newspaper in the 
United States. Chicago Tribune was used because the 1982 Tylenol tampering occurred in the 
Chicago area.  
 
 
Content analysis method 
  
Content analysis is a quantitative research method aimed at summarizing key elements 
rather than the minute details of a sample (Neuendorf, 2002). Additionally, content analyses allow 
researchers to make valid inferences in the data’s context that can be replicated (Krippendorf, 
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2004). The first content analysis was introduced in 1941 and scholars at that time focused on the 
analysis of manifest data (Krippendorf, 2004). Manifest data is objective and does not require the 
researcher to extrapolate ideas or themes; one example is simply counting words. However, as the 
method has evolved and gained more acceptance, many communication scholars now recognize the 
contribution of the researcher’s analysis of latent data as well. Latent data requires more subjective 
judgment and cannot be measured directly, but can be represented by one or more indicators. This 
distinction is especially important to ensure that the quantitative elements of the analysis are not 
taken out of context and can be used to make inferences about the data that is being examined 
(Riffe, Lacy & Ficco, 1998). The present study examined both manifest and latent data within news 
coverage in New York Times and Chicago Tribune.  
The content analysis method is also appropriate for research involving media framing 
because it allows a methodical description of various news coverage. The unit of analysis for this 
study was each newspaper article. Using the entire article for the content analysis was the best 
approach to ensure the most accurate description of the newspaper coverage because the research 
questions concern overarching descriptions of the crisis and Johnson & Johnson. Oftentimes, the 
crisis, organizational response, or reputation management strategy is described throughout several 
paragraphs. Therefore, if the unit of analysis focused on the paragraph, the researcher would run 
the risk of not understanding the full context of the coverage and the description that is provided. 
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Search strategy 
 
 New York Times is regarded as a prestige publication by numerous communication scholars 
and holds accolades such as the most Pulitzer prizes won out of all news organizations, the greatest 
reach among national opinion leaders, and an audience of nearly 5 million readers (New York 
Times, 2012; Seibel & Smith 2009; DeCicco, 1988). Therefore the current study examined articles 
from New York Times because it is widely held as an industry leader. Chicago Tribune was used 
because this publication would likely have a heavy concentration of coverage surrounding the past 
and current crisis since the 1982 tampering occurred in the Chicago area.  
New York Times and Chicago Tribune coverage from the original J&J recall was analyzed 
from September 1, 1982 through September 1, 1983. The date range for this article retrieval was 
based on the date of the first media reports of the Tylenol tampering. New York Times articles were 
compiled using the LexisNexis academic database and the search was guided by the following 
Boolean search: “Tylenol” AND “Johnson & Johnson”. This search process produced 89 newspaper 
reports from New York Times. Chicago Tribune articles were identified using the same search terms 
on the Chicago Tribune web site archival search. This search process produced 19 newspaper 
reports from Chicago Tribune. 
New York Times and Chicago Tribune coverage from December 1, 2009 through April 17, 
2012 was also examined. The date range for the article retrieval was based on the beginning of the 
series of recalls for J&J that started at the end of November 2009. New York Times articles were 
identified using the LexisNexis academic database and the search was guided by the following 
Boolean search: "Johnson & Johnson" OR "DePuy Orthopaedics" OR "McNeil Consumer Healthcare" 
OR "Tylenol" AND "recall". This search process produced 84 New York Times newspaper reports. 
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Chicago Tribune articles were identified using the same search terms on the Chicago Tribune web 
site archival search. The search process produced 32 Chicago Tribune newspaper reports.  
 The researcher applied inclusion and exclusion criteria to the 224 articles that were 
identified during the searches to ensure relevance to the research questions posed. The researcher 
excluded any articles related to J&J’s financial reports, or executive departures and appointments, 
and duplicate articles. The final sample combined New York Times and Chicago Tribune articles and 
consisted of 28 articles from the 1982 coverage and 41 articles from the current coverage, making a 
total of 69 reports for analysis. 
 
 
Coding scheme 
 
The coding scheme pertained to variables identified in the research questions. The 
researcher drew upon the work of Benoit (1997), Coombs (2006), and Sturges (1994) to develop a 
coding scheme to examine the newspaper coverage. Appendix B reports the coding scheme. 
The coding scheme provided instructions to record the publication date and author for each 
article. The past recalls variable was recorded as “yes” or “no” based on whether or not the 
coverage made a reference to past recalls from J&J or its subsidiaries. A list of J&J’s subsidiaries can 
be found in Appendix C. There was also a question that was used only for the current (November 
2009 – April 2012) sample regarding whether or not the coverage referred to the1982 Tylenol 
tampering specifically. According to SSCT, media coverage of an organization’s history of previous 
crises can make it more difficult for the organization to repair its reputation. Therefore this 
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category was used to identify whether or not crisis history was referred to in the newspaper 
coverage. 
 
 
Crisis type variable 
  
The coding scheme provided instructions to examine the news coverage to determine if a 
specific crisis type was described. The identification was based on Coombs and Holladay’s (2002) 
crisis type categorizations: victim, accident, and preventable. Media reports that described the 
crisis as the victim type were identified by reviewing the coverage to see if J&J was called a victim, if 
the coverage described a tampering, sabotage or workplace violence; or if responsibility was 
attributed outside of the J&J family of companies. The accident frame was identified by any mention 
of technical breakdown, mechanical failure, or undetectable problems. The preventable frame was 
identified if the news coverage stated that J&J intentionally and knowingly put stakeholders at risk, 
violated the law, or if human error was the cause and could have been prevented with more 
thorough training. The coder also indicated if there was no reference to crisis type. 
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Evaluation of J&J’s operational response variable 
 
The way in which the media described J&J’s handling of recalls was identified by examining 
the tone that the news coverage used to describe J&J’s operational response to the crisis. 
Operational responses include: the corrective actions taken in response to the crisis (i.e., 
procedural changes, additional employee training; or instituting new quality control measures). 
This category contained four possible types of tone: positive, negative, both positive and negative, 
or neutral reference. The intent of this category was for the coder to identify the tone of the 
descriptions of J&J’s actions in response to the recalls. 
The positive reference was identified by any mention similar to J&J making necessary 
improvements, ensuring that products were safe, crediting J&J with making sure that stakeholders 
were aware of dangers, and J&J responding adequately and in a timely fashion. The negative 
reference was identified if the news coverage described J&J’s response negatively, accused J&J of 
poor response to the issue, described J&J’s actions as negligible, or criticized J&J’s response. The 
both positive and negative reference was used when the news coverage provided both positive and 
negative information regarding J&J’s operational handling and response to the recall. The neutral 
reference was identified by coverage that objectively reported actions or details regarding what 
measures J&J was taking to handle the recall and did not include an evaluation of the response. The 
coder also indicated if there was no description of J&J’s operational response. All of the attributes 
within the positive, negative, and both positive and negative categories that were listed in the 
coding scheme did not have to be described in the news coverage for a category to be recorded. 
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Overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation variable 
 
The overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation category sought to describe the tone used in news 
coverage to evaluated J&J as a company overall. The coding scheme provided examples of terms 
that could possibly be found in the coverage and deemed as favorable or unfavorable. The coder 
also indicated if the news coverage did not describe J&J’s reputation. The coding scheme instructed 
the coder to identify which category was dominant in the article. The favorable tone was identified 
by looking for terms of admiration, honor, validation, and praise in regards to J&J’s reputation. The 
unfavorable tone was identified by news coverage that was critical of J&J, mentioned poor quality 
control, or described the problem as a pattern of continued issues.  
Information giving was identified based on any description of a formal organizational 
response in the news coverage. For the purposes of this study, any reference to a formal response 
to the crisis was assumed to have originated with the organization unless it was attributed to a 
third party such as first responders, government officials or industry experts. The categories were 
based on Sturges’ (1994) two categories of information giving which are instructing information 
and adjusting information.  
 
 
Inclusion of instructing information variable & inclusion of adjusting 
information variable 
 
Instructing information was identified by information that outlined how people could 
protect themselves physically and financially from the crisis. This strategy also could instruct the 
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business community on whether employees should report to work or how business operations 
were being affected. The adjusting information strategy was identified in the news coverage by 
information that was geared toward helping people cope psychologically with the crisis and explain 
what was being done to prevent a recurrence.  
 
 
Inclusion of a reputation management strategy variable 
 
The reputation management strategy category enabled the coder to identify whether or not 
the news coverage described a reputation management strategy that J&J used. The coding scheme 
instructed the coder to consider the macro-level categories of strategic responses to help narrow 
down what reputation management strategies were being described if any. The macro-level 
strategic response categories were: deny, diminish, rebuild, and reinforce. These categories were 
not recorded, but were used as a guide to help the coder identify any micro-level reputation 
management strategies. Then the coding scheme provided instructions to record which of the 14 
reputation management strategies were used. The strategy descriptions were based on Coombs’ 
(2012) typology. The coding scheme gave instructions to record the most dominant strategy first 
followed by the other strategies in descending order of dominance because multiple reputation 
management strategies might have been present in an article. The coder also indicated if no 
reputation management strategy was presented in the article. 
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Intercoder reliability 
 
In order to assess the reliability of the coding scheme, two coders were used to establish the 
coding reliability prior to coding the actual data set. The researcher conducted a training session 
with two coders to explain and demonstrate use of the coding scheme. The coders were blind to the 
specific research questions guiding the investigation. They were given a sample of crisis news 
reports unrelated to J&J to code to test their understanding of and ability to use the coding scheme. 
After the initial coding, the researcher and coders discussed discrepancies in coding and identified 
ways to refine the instrument. The researcher made minor adjustments to the coding scheme based 
on the coders’ recommendations. After the coding scheme was modified, the coders examined a 
subset of J&J news coverage from The Washington Post and USA Today to validate the coding 
scheme. 
The coders recorded data on a spreadsheet created by the researcher. Both coders reviewed 
a sub-sample of 20 articles from publications other than New York Times and Chicago Tribune, 
which represented nearly 30% of the total number of articles in the actual sample. Each coder’s 
responses were compared to ensure that the data was recorded in the same order. The intercoder 
reliabilities for each variable were computed using Cohen’s kappa coefficient. The assessment of the 
level of agreement was based on Landis’ and Koch’s (1977) agreement classifications: 0 - .20 = 
slight agreement, .21 – .40 = fair agreement, .41 – .60 = moderate agreement, .61 – .80 = substantial 
agreement, and .81 – 1.00 = almost perfect agreement. Table 2 reports the coding reliabilities and 
the interpretations of the reliability coefficients. It should be noted that the results of the reputation 
management strategy variables were collapsed into the four primary strategic response categories 
to see if the reliability of the first, second and third most dominant reputation management strategy 
variables would improve. 
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Table 2 Intercoder Reliability 
 
Variable Cohen’s Kappa Agreement 
Mention of the 1982 recall Undefined n/a 
Mention of previous recalls .588 Moderate 
Crisis type .209 Slight 
Evaluation of J&J’s response to the crisis .222 Fair 
Overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation .905 Almost Perfect 
Crisis response – instructing information .604 Moderate 
Crisis response – adjusting information .339 Fair 
Most dominant strategic response category .411 Moderate 
2nd most dominant strategic response category .260 Fair 
3rd most dominant strategic response category -.0219 No 
Most dominant reputation mgmt. strategy .486 Moderate 
2nd most dominant reputation mgmt. strategy .196 Slight 
3rd most dominant reputation mgmt. strategy -.0219 No 
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Although Cohen’s kappa for mention of the 1982 recall was undefined, it should be noted 
that the coders had 100% agreement, which is the likely explanation for the undefined kappa. The 
relatively low coding reliabilities could have resulted from the coders’ examination of latent content 
rather than manifest content. As previously discussed, latent content requires the coder to make 
more subjective interpretations of the data. Lower than expected intercoder reliabilities may have 
resulted from the difficulty of the coding tasks (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999).  
Due to the difficulty that was encountered in establishing the reliability of the coding 
scheme and the complexity of the coding tasks, the final coding decisions were made by the 
researcher. The researcher’s familiarity with the J&J cases and concepts represented in the coding 
scheme was considered when the decision was made to allow the researcher to code the actual data 
set. The final data set consisted of a total of 69 newspaper articles, 28 from 1982 and 41 from 
November 2009 – April 2012. Each newspaper article was analyzed using the coding scheme.  
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter described the research method employed for this study, described the way the 
sample was collected, outlined the operational definitions used to examine the newspaper 
coverage, and described the coding scheme and coding process. Chapter three presents the results 
of the statistical analyses that were used to address the research questions. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS 
 
Chapter two explained the methods used to gather the data, described the coding scheme 
and explained the coding process that was used to describe the news coverage. This chapter 
presents the results of the analyses used to examine the research questions. Frequencies for each 
variable were computed to observe the data distributions. 
 
 
Test of Research Questions 
 
Evaluation of J&J’s operational response variable 
 
Research Question 1 inquired if there was a difference in how the media described Johnson 
& Johnson’s operational response to the crisis and its overall reputation in 1982 and the current 
crises (November 2009 – April 2012). To address Research Question 1, the frequencies for two 
variables were compared for the 1982 media reports and the current media reports: how the news 
articles evaluated J&J’s operational response to the crisis and how the news coverage evaluated 
J&J’s overall reputation.  
First, the evaluation of J&J’s response referred to how the news coverage described J&J’s 
operational/physical response to the crisis. It could be categorized as positive, negative, both 
positive and negative, or no evaluation. The distribution for this variable is shown in Figure 1. Of 
the 28 articles from the 1982 news coverage, the evaluation of J&J’s response to the crisis were 
described as follows: 3.6% (n=1) positive; 0% negative; 0% both positive and negative; and 96.4% 
(n=27) no evaluation. In comparison, of the 41 articles from November 2009 – April 2012, 4.9% 
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(n=2) described a positive response; 24.4% (n=10) described a negative response; 0% described 
both a positive and negative response; and 70.7% (n=29) did not evaluate J&J’s response. A visual 
inspection of the data distributions suggests that majority of the stories in both samples contained 
no evaluations of J&J’s operational response. The number of occurrences in the “both” category 
were negligible. 
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Figure 1 Evaluation of Johnson & Johnson’s Operational Response 
 
Although a crosstabs analysis is appropriate for nominal data, the low number of 
occurrences for most categories presented a challenge for statistical analysis. With this 
consideration, the chi-square statistic was not a suitable measure to use with this variable.  
The proportions of actual occurrences in each sample were computed where the “no 
evaluation” was excluded. The 1982 sample contained 100% (n=1) positive evaluation compared to 
16.7% (n=2) positive evaluations and 83.3% (n=10) negative evaluations in the current sample. 
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The frequencies suggest that when the current news coverage did evaluate J&J’s operational 
response it was overwhelmingly negative. 
 
 
Overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation variable 
 
The second variable that was used to examine Research Question 1 was the overall 
evaluation of J&J’s reputation which referred to how the news coverage described J&J as an 
organization. The coverage could be identified as favorable, unfavorable or no mention. The 
distribution is shown in Figure 2. Of 28 articles from the 1982 news coverage the overall evaluation 
of J&J’s reputation was categorized as follows: 3.5% (n=1) favorable; 3.5% (n=1) unfavorable; and 
93% (n=26) no mention. In comparison, of the 41 articles from November 2009 – April 2012, 0% 
described J&J’s reputation favorably; 17% (n=7) described J&J’s reputation unfavorably; and 83% 
(n=34) did not mention J&J’s reputation.  
A visual inspection of the data showed that majority of the news coverage in both samples 
did not provide an overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation. Therefore, the “no evaluation” category 
was dropped to permit an examination of only those instances where evaluations were provided. 
Frequencies were inspected after dropping the low frequency category. Of the 1982 news coverage, 
50% (n=1) described J&J’s reputation favorably and 50% (n=1) described it unfavorably. In 
comparison, 100% (n=7) of the occurrences in the current sample described J&J’s reputation 
unfavorably. The data distribution for this variable showed that the media coverage in both 
samples tended not to evaluate J&J’s overall reputation. Therefore, a cross tabs analysis is 
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unsuitable for this variable due to the low occurrences of favorable and unfavorable responses. 
However, a visual inspection of the frequency distributions for the data reveals that when an 
evaluation appeared in the 1982 sample, there was an even balance of favorable and unfavorable 
descriptions. In contrast, in the current sample, all of the evaluations that did occur were 
unfavorable. 
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Figure 2 Evaluation of Johnson & Johnson’s Overall Reputation 
 
 
Crisis type variable 
 
Research Question 2 asked if there was a difference in the crisis type that the news media 
described in the 1982 coverage and the current coverage (November 2009 – April 2012). To 
address Research Question 2, the frequencies for the crisis type variable were compared. Crisis type 
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referred to whether the news coverage described the crisis as a victim crisis, accident crisis, 
preventable crisis, or if no crisis type was described. The distribution for the crisis type variable is 
shown in Figure 3. 
Of 28 articles from the 1982 sample there were 35.7% (n=10) victim; 0% accident; 0% 
preventable; and 64.3% (n=18) no crisis type. In comparison, of the 41 articles from November 
2009 – April 2012, 0% described a victim crisis; 24% (n=10) described an accident crisis; 22% 
(n=9) described a preventable crisis; and 54% (n=22) did not describe a crisis type. The no crisis 
type category occurred most frequently in both samples. However, when a crisis type was 
mentioned in 1982, 100% (n=10) of the articles described the victim crisis type. In contrast, when a 
crisis type was mentioned in the current sample, 52.6% (n=10) of the mentions were described as 
accident crises and 47.4% (n=9) were described as a preventable crisis. The data distributions 
showed that the media coverage in both samples tended to not identify the recall as a specific crisis 
type. However when a crisis type was described, the 1982 sample described a victim crisis in all 
instances, while the current coverage only described the crisis as accident or preventable. 
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Figure 3 Crisis Type 
 
A crosstabs analysis was performed to compare the descriptions of crisis types from the 
samples. The analysis indicated that there was a significant difference in the media coverage of the 
Johnson & Johnson recall in 1982 data and the current data, χ2(3)=27.943, p<.001, V=.636. The 
statistical significance and a large effect size (Cohen, 1988) indicate the difference between the two 
samples was meaningful. However, these results are not reliable due to three cells having expected 
counts less than five. 
Research Question 3 asked if there was a difference in references to prior recalls in the 
news coverage of the Johnson & Johnson 1982 recall and the current recall coverage (November 
2009 – April 2012). To address Research Question 3, the frequencies for two variables were used: 
1) the mention of a previous recall and 2) the mention of the 1982 recall in the current sample only. 
The mention of a previous recall variable referred to whether or not the news coverage referred to 
a prior recall that occurred in the current timeframe and could be answered either yes or no. Of 28 
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articles from the 1982 news coverage, none referred to a previous recall. In contrast, the current 
sample contained had 19.5% (n=8) articles that did not refer to a previous recall and 80.5% (n=33) 
that did refer to a previous recall that occurred in the current timeframe. The examination of 
frequencies demonstrated that there were no references to a previous recall in 1982. The lack of 
publicity of large scale recalls in 1982 is a possible explanation for the lack of mentions of previous 
recalls. However, the large number of recalls that occurred in the current time frame is perhaps the 
reason that the current sample mentioned previous recalls more often. The distributions are shown 
in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 References to a Previous Recall within the Current Timeframe of the Article 
 
J&J’s management of the 1982 recall has often been regarded as exemplary; therefore the 
current data set was also examined for mentions of the 1982 recall specifically. Media coverage 
from the current data set was used to examine how often the news coverage referred to the 1982 
recall specifically. According to the current data set, 7.3% (n=3) referred to the 1982 recall and 
92.7% (n=38) of the articles did not mention the 1982 recall. No statistical analyses were 
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performed for Research Question 3 regarding mentions of previous recalls or mentions of the 1982 
recall in the current sample due to the fact that no articles from the 1982 sample mentioned a 
previous recall and because of the large number of current articles that did not refer to the 1982 
recall. 
 
 
Inclusion of instructing information variable & inclusion of adjusting 
information variable 
 
Research Question 4 inquired if there was a difference between the media’s reports of 
Johnson & Johnson’s use of instructing and adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises 
(November 2009 – April 2012). To address Research Question 4, the frequencies for reports of 
instructing information and adjusting information were examined separately. Instructing 
information was identified by formal responses from J&J that helped people cope physically and 
financially with the crisis. The distributions for instructing information are shown in Figure 5. Of 
the 28 articles from 1982, 32.1% (n=9) provided instructing information while 67.9% (n=19) did 
not. In comparison, of the 41 articles from the current sample, 51.2% (n=21) provided instructing 
information and 48.8% (n=20) did not.  
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Figure 5 Inclusion of Instructing Information 
 
A crosstabs analysis was performed to compare the inclusion of instructing information 
reported in the 1982 sample and the current sample. The crosstabs analysis indicated that there 
was not a significant difference in the inclusion of instructing information in the 1982 data and the 
current data, χ2(1)=2.464, p=.143 , Ф= .189. The effect size was small (Cohen, 1988). These results 
indicate the difference between the two samples was not meaningful.  
The second variable used to answer Research Question 4 was adjusting information which 
referred to information that was designed to help people cope psychologically with the crisis. The 
distributions for adjusting information are shown in Figure 6. Of the 28 articles from 1982, 60.7% 
(n=17) provided adjusting information while 39.3% (n=11) did not. In comparison, of the 41 
articles from the current sample, 61% (n=25) provided adjusting information and 39% (n=16) did 
not.  
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A visual examination of the data shows there should be no difference between the inclusion 
of adjusting information in both samples. The crosstabs analysis confirmed that there was not a 
significant difference in the media inclusions of adjusting information for the 1982 data and the 
current data, χ2(1)=.000, p=1.000 , Ф= .0003. The lack of statistical significance and the small effect 
size (Cohen, 1988) indicate the difference between the samples was not meaningful. 
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Figure 6 Inclusion of Adjusting Information 
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Inclusion of a reputation management strategy variable 
 
Research Question 5 asked which reputation management strategy (or strategies) was 
reported in the 1982 and current news coverage. To be included in the reputation management 
category, the strategy described had to be directly attributed to J&J versus a third party like the 
FDA. To address Research Question 5, the frequencies for the reputation management strategy 
variable were used. The 1982 sample contained 14 articles that did not describe a reputation 
management strategy used by J&J compared to 12 articles from the current sample that did not 
describe a reputation management strategy.  
Although the coder was instructed to list the most dominant reputation management 
strategy followed by the 2nd most dominant and third most dominant, those responses were all 
combined for the analysis because it was more important to identify any reputation management 
strategies that were used regardless of dominance. Thus, excluding the articles that did not mention 
a reputation management strategy that was used, the frequencies were computed based on the 
total number of times that the coder recorded a reputation management strategy instead of the 
total number of articles in each sample. The total number of instances for the 1982 sample was 18 
and there were 48 for the current sample. 
The 1982 news coverage reflected the following frequencies of the reputation management 
strategy category: 0% attack the accuser, 0% denial, 0% scapegoat, 28% (n=5) suffering, 0% 
excuse, 0% deny volition, 6% (n=1) justification, 39% (n=7) compensation, 0% apology, 6% (n=1) 
repentance, 22% (n=4) rectification, 0% bolstering, 0% transcendence, and 0% ingratiation. The 
current news coverage had the following number of mentions: 0% attack the accuser, 10.4% (n=5) 
denial, 6.3% (n=3) scapegoat, 0% suffering, 6.3% (n=3) excuse, 0% deny volition, 27.1% (n=13) 
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justification, 12.5% (n=6) compensation, 6.3% (n=3) apology, 0% repentance, 25% (n=12) 
rectification, 6.3% (n=3) bolstering, 0% transcendence, and 0% ingratiation. A visual examination 
of the data indicated that several categories within the variable were not present in either sample 
and in most instances there was not a reputation management strategy described. The combined 
frequencies for this variable are displayed in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Reputation Management Strategies Combined 
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Due to the small frequencies for most of the categories within the 14 micro-level reputation 
management strategies, the reputation management strategies were collapsed into the four macro-
level strategic response categories for further analysis. The macro-level strategic response 
categories were deny, diminish, rebuild, reinforce, and no mention. The attack the accuser, denial, 
scapegoat, and suffering strategies were combined into the deny category. The excuse, deny 
volition, and justification strategies were combined into the diminish category. The compensation, 
apology, repentance, and rectification strategies were combined into the rebuild category. The 
bolstering, transcendence, and ingratiation strategies were combined into the reinforce category. 
The no mention category was used for news coverage that did not provide a description. The 1982 
sample contained 14 articles that did not describe a reputation management strategy used by J&J 
compared to 12 articles from the current sample that did not describe a reputation management 
strategy 
These frequencies were also computed based on the total number of times that the coder 
recorded a reputation management strategy instead of the total number of articles in each sample. 
The total number of instances for the 1982 sample was 18 and there were 48 for the current 
sample. When all instances of the strategic response categories were combined, without 
consideration for dominance, the 1982 sample contained the following: 27.8% (n=5) deny, 5.6% 
(n=1) diminish, 66.7% (n=12) rebuild, and 0% reinforce. The current sample had: 17% (n=8) deny, 
33% (n=16) diminish, 43.8% (n=21) rebuild, and 6.3% (n=3) reinforce. The distribution is shown in 
Figure 8. 
A visual examination of the data shows that majority of the articles in both samples did not 
describe a strategic response category that was employed by J&J. One point of interest is that only 
1.2% of the 1982 coverage described the diminish category. In comparison, the current sample 
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described the diminish category in 13% of the articles. A point of interest may also lie in the fact 
that when the news coverage did describe a strategic response category, both the 1982 and current 
sample used the rebuild strategy the most.  
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Figure 8 Strategic Response Categories Combined 
 
 
Summary 
 
This section described the frequencies that were computed for each variable. A complete 
list of the data frequencies appears in Appendix D. Research Question 1 asked if there was a 
difference between the way that the news coverage described J&J’s handling of the response in the 
1982 coverage and the current coverage. Research Question 1 did not include a statistical analysis 
due to the large number of articles that did not provide an evaluation. However, when considering 
the articles that did provide evaluations, the frequency distributions did indicate that the 1982 
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sample contained 100% (n=1) positive evaluation compared to 16.7% (n=2) positive evaluations 
and 83.3% (n=10) negative evaluations in the current sample.  
In addition, the second variable used to answer Research Question 1 indicated that of the 
1982 news coverage, 50% (n=1) described J&J’s reputation favorably and 50% (n=1) described it 
unfavorably. In comparison, 100% (n=7) of the occurrences in the current sample described J&J’s 
reputation unfavorably.  
The answer to Research Question 2 was that there was a very meaningful difference in how 
the news media described the Johnson & Johnson recall in 1982 sample and the current sample. 
However, the reliability of the statistical significance was questionable due to the number of cells 
with expected counts less than five. The frequency distributions suggested that the no crisis type 
category occurred most frequently in both samples. However, when crisis type was mentioned, it 
was always described as a victim crisis in the 1982 sample and either described as an accident or 
preventable crisis in the current sample. 
No statistical analyses were performed for Research Question 3 that asked if there was a 
difference in references to prior recalls in the news coverage of Johnson & Johnson’s 1982 recall 
and the current recall coverage (November 2009 – April 2012) due to the fact that none of the 1982 
articles mentioned a previous recall. Thus a crosstabs analysis was not conducted to compare it to 
the current sample. However, the frequency distribution did show that 80% of the current sample 
referred to a previous recall. The second variable used to answer Research Question 3, was 
regarding mentions of the 1982 recall in the current sample. The frequency distribution showed 
that more than 90% of the current news coverage did not mention the 1982 recall specifically. 
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The answer to Research Question 4 was that there was not a meaningful difference between 
the news coverage’s description of Johnson & Johnson’s use of instructing and adjusting 
information in the 1982 sample or the current recall. The frequency distributions showed that 
32.1% of the 1982 sample described instructing information while 51.2% of the current sample 
described it. The frequency distributions showed that there was not a large difference between the 
inclusion of instructing or adjusting information in the samples, and the indication was confirmed 
by the crosstabs analyses. The frequency distributions for adjusting information showed that 
60.7% (n=17) of the 1982 sample provided adjusting information while 39.3% (n=11) did not. In 
comparison, of the 41 articles from the current sample, 61% (n=25) provided adjusting information 
and 39% (n=16) did not. 
Research Question 5 asked which reputation management strategies were included in the 
media coverage. The 1982 news coverage showed that J&J used the deny, diminish and rebuild 
strategic responses. The current news coverage reported that J&J used the deny, diminish, 
reinforce, and rebuild strategic responses. Both samples indicated that the media reported the 
rebuild strategy most often. 
This chapter described the results of the analyses performed to answer the research 
questions. The next chapter will provide an interpretation of the results and a discussion of the 
study’s strengths and limitations. In addition, the chapter will discuss directions for future research 
and practical and theoretical implications of the work. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 The previous chapter presented the results of the analyses employed to answer the 
research questions. This chapter provides a discussion of the results and addresses some of the 
study’s limitations. Theoretical and practical implications of the present study are presented and 
directions for future research are offered. 
 The purpose of this study was to examine news coverage from the 1982 J&J Tylenol recall 
and compare it to current news coverage of J&J’s recalls to understand how media coverage of the 
recalls may have differed. The study used J&J as a case study to see if news coverage surrounding 
each crisis supported the central claims of media framing research, crisis communication research, 
and reputation management research. Previous research suggests the 1982 Tylenol recall would be 
defined as a victim crisis whereas the current series of recalls would be classified as either accident 
or preventable crises (Coombs & Holladay, 2002). The 1982 product tampering crisis resulted in 
several deaths. However, the current recalls have not resulted in a loss of life or any serious bodily 
harm. Nevertheless, J&J’s poor responses to the current recalls have forced the FDA to intervene 
and seize control of operations in several of J&J’s plants. 
 J&J’s superb crisis management during the 1982 Tylenol recall garnered extensive 
recognition and has become an exemplary case from which other organizations can learn. As J&J 
has faced less severe crises than the 1982 recall since November 2009, the organization seems to be 
failing to uphold the precedent that was set nearly 30 years ago. This stark contrast is surprising to 
those who are familiar with both cases. Comparisons can be made between how the 1982 coverage 
described the 1982 recall and how the current coverage described J&J’s current crises. The content 
analysis method is an appropriate tool for this examination. 
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 The media determine what is newsworthy and decide how to frame the information they 
present about the organization and the crisis. Organizations like J&J can provide information to 
journalists in an effort to provide clarity to the situation and to minimize reputational damage 
during crises like the recalls. However, the media are not required to use the information and they 
ultimately decide what information is shared with the public via the news coverage. Thus, the 
media coverage is selective and may not include all information provided by J&J. 
 Information that is relayed in news coverage may have significant impacts on public 
perceptions and attitudes. Media framing research suggests that people’s perceptions are 
influenced by news coverage. In addition, communication research suggests that news coverage is 
more likely to be negative than positive. Organizations should be concerned about media 
representations because of the potential that news coverage has to affect the way people view 
issues and events. The current systematic analysis of media coverage of J&J’s recall crises 
contributes to our understanding of the specific contents of media coverage, including what is 
reported as well as evaluations of the organization that is being reported about. 
 The content categories used to examine the research questions and compare the 1982 recall 
and the current recalls were developed based on media framing research, tenets of the Coombs’ 
(1995) SCCT, and Sturges’ (1994) information giving strategies, and were as follows: mention of 
1982 recalls, mention of previous recalls, crisis type, evaluation of J&J’s response to the crisis, 
overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation, inclusion of instructing information, inclusion of adjusting 
information, and description of reputation management strategies. 
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 These categories were selected based on their relevance to the public’s understanding of 
the recalls and their potential evaluation of J&J and its actions. Although the present study did not 
focus on the public perspective and resulting behaviors, the descriptions can offer insights into 
possible impacts of news coverage. More importantly, the results hold implications for 
organizations seeking to recover from negative events such as crises. 
 
 
Significance of the Results 
 
 Research Question 1 asked if there was a difference in how the media described Johnson & 
Johnson’s handling of the crisis in 1982 and the current crises (November 2009 – April 2012). A 
comparison of the frequency distributions of the samples did show that 96.4% of the 1982 sample 
and 70.7% of the current articles did not evaluate J&J’s operational response. However, when 
considering only instances where evaluations of J&J’s operational responses were offered, the 
media was more likely to provide positive evaluations of the 1982 recall. 
 According to SCCT, the 1982 crisis would be categorized as a victim crisis, while the current 
recalls would be defined as accident or preventable crises, which was illustrated through the crisis 
type variable (RQ2). A central idea underlying SCCT suggests that more responsibility is attributed 
to the organization during accident and preventable crises than in victim crises. There was a small 
number of occurrences in the samples: 1982 sample: (n=1) positive and current sample (n=2) 
positive and (n=10) negative evaluations. However, the negative evaluations of the current crises 
support the basic idea of SCCT regarding attribution of responsibility and crisis type. In contrast, in 
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the 1982 recall J&J was the victim of product tampering and J&J’s operational response was 
described in a positive light, which also is consistent with assumptions underlying SCCT. 
 The fact that there was such a small number of evaluations possibly suggests that although 
the news coverage describes a crisis type with high attributions of responsibility, it does not 
guarantee that the same article will also describe the organization’s operational response 
negatively.   
 A second variable, overall evaluation of J&J’s reputation, also was used to address Research 
Question 1. No statistical analyses were conducted due to the low occurrence of reputational 
evaluations. However, this is also an important finding for the overall reputation variable. The data 
indicates that the media coverage rarely included reputational evaluations. In 93% and 83% of the 
articles, respectively, journalists did not offer an assessment of J&J’s reputation. When this finding 
is considered with the crisis type variable (RQ2), it suggests that journalists may be reluctant to 
offer blatant evaluations of organizations in spite of the type of crisis that is being reported on. 
 Research Question 2 asked if there was a difference in how the news media described the 
Johnson & Johnson recall in 1982 and the current recalls (November 2009 – April 2012). The 
analysis focused on the crisis type variable. As was the case with the overall reputation variable, the 
frequencies indicated that most articles did not identify a crisis type. However, when considering 
only those articles where a crisis type was identified, all 10 of the articles in the 1982 sample 
described the crisis as a victim crisis while 52.6% (n=10) of the current sample described it as an 
accident crisis and 47.4% (n=9) described it as a preventable crisis. These results confirm the 
expectation that the 1982 recall would be described differently than the current recalls based on 
Coombs’ (1995) crisis type categorizations. This confirmation is valuable because it can also help 
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support the results for other research questions that suggest different categorizations of the crises 
may have an impact on other descriptions and evaluations within the news coverage. 
 Research Question 3 asked if there was a difference in references to prior recalls in the 
news coverage of Johnson & Johnson’s 1982 recall and the current recalls. The 1982 sample did not 
include any references to a previous recall. In contrast, about 80% of the current sample referred to 
previous recalls. One possible explanation for the absence of references to recalls in the 1982 
sample was that J&J may not have experienced any noteworthy recalls prior to the Tylenol 
tampering. Another explanation for the 1982 coverage not referring to previous recalls is that since 
the 1982 tampering involved deaths, perhaps the journalists were careful to not include 
information on less significant events while reporting on deaths. 
 SCCT suggests that past crises may be used to judge organizations’ stability based on 
patterns in behavior, which is referred to as crisis history (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). An event that 
occurs frequently and appears to be happening in patterns refers to a stable event while an event 
that happens rarely is referred to as an unstable event. Additionally SCCT suggests that individuals 
are more forgiving of unstable crises in contrast to stable crises that are viewed more harshly 
because they seem to identify underlying issues that are causing the situation to recur. Therefore, 
one would assume that news coverage that mentions previous recalls would also likely be more 
negative than coverage that did not. 
 The fact that the majority of the current sample referred to a previous recall could support 
the SCCT concept of crisis history when consideration is also given to the depiction and evaluation 
of J&J in that news coverage. Findings from Research Question 1 illustrated that when an evaluation 
was included, the current news coverage was more negative in its evaluation of J&J’s operational 
response. All of the occurrences of an evaluation of J&J’s reputation were unfavorable in the current 
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sample also. The fact that most of the current articles mentioned a previous recall and were also 
critical of J&J supports the crisis history idea that more attribution of responsibility is associated 
with stable events. 
 While the present results cannot reveal a causal relationship between references to past 
recalls and the evaluation of the organization in crisis, they do suggest that there was a difference in 
the news coverage surrounding the 1982 recall and the current crises. The present data showed 
that J&J’s 1982 crisis would likely be described as a victim crisis, which absolves the organization of 
all responsibility. Therefore, one could assume that news coverage would also be less likely to 
mention previous problems if any existed. The data described the current crises as either accident 
or preventable crises according to Coombs’ (1995) crisis type categorizations, therefore one would 
expect the coverage to attribute more responsibility to J&J based on the concepts of SCCT. With this 
consideration, one could also assume that the coverage may be more likely to mention past recalls 
in the current coverage to show a pattern. The fact that there was a difference in the frequencies of 
previous recalls between the two samples could possibly support this assumption. Another possible 
consideration to support the SCCT crisis history concept is that J&J’s previous management may 
have set high standards for the way that J&J would respond to crises. Therefore, current journalists 
may be less forgiving of J&J’s current recall woes and view them more egregiously due to the 
positive history established by J&J’s efforts in 1982.  
 The current sample was also examined for references to the 1982 recall specifically. The 
frequency distribution showed that there were no mentions of the 1982 recall in the current 
coverage. The reason to identify such mentions was to see if a reference to J&J’s handling of the 
1982 recall, which was likely to be positive, would contrast with a negative tone in the current 
news coverage, since the current recalls were accident and preventable crises. About 97% of the 
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current articles did not mention the 1982 recall. This was surprising because of the widespread 
attention received by the crisis during the time it occurred and the use of the 1982 case as an 
exemplary model of crisis communication efforts.  
 One possible explanation for this result is that communication scholars may be more aware 
of J&J’s highly-regarded response to the 1982 crisis because of its status as a role model of effective 
communication in communication literature. Another possible explanation is that journalists may 
not view the 1982 recall as relevant to the current recalls since the 1982 recall was categorized as a 
victim crisis with deaths associated with it whereas the current recalls are seen as accident or 
preventable crises. It is possible that the journalists would consider it crass to compare or contrast 
the two. This data also suggests that crisis type may influence how journalists elect to frame a crisis. 
An alternative explanation is that journalists may assume that most people know about the original 
tampering case and therefore it is not necessary for them to mention it in the article. Since nearly 
30 years have passed since the 1982 tampering, there is also the possibility that the journalists are 
unfamiliar with the case and therefore exclude it.  
 Research Question 4 inquired if there was a difference between Johnson & Johnson’s use of 
instructing and adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises (November 2009 – April 
2012). Instructing and adjusting information are two information-giving strategies that are viewed 
as central to crisis communication. The results indicated that there was no difference in J&J’s use of 
instructing or adjusting information in 1982 and the current crises. In addition, both samples 
included adjusting information more often than instructing information. These results were not 
surprising since Sturges (1994) and Coombs (2012) both suggest that it is important to provide 
both instructing and adjusting information during crises of any type. 
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 Coombs (2006) also suggests that different types of crises warrant different reputation 
management strategies. A basic idea underlying SCCT is that crisis management strategies should 
be matched to crisis type. Based on that idea, Research Question 5 asks which reputation 
management strategies the news coverage reported that J&J used in the 1982 sample and the 
current sample. The results showed that the media reported that J&J used deny, diminish, and 
rebuild strategic response categories in the 1982 news coverage. The results indicated that the 
deny, diminish, reinforce and rebuild strategic response categories were reported in the current 
news coverage. The largest difference between the samples appeared in the diminish category. The 
diminish category includes statements that imply that although the accused organization is 
somewhat at fault for the crisis, the standards being used by accusers to evaluate the impact are 
inappropriate. Additionally, these statements may suggest that the organization should not be held 
responsible for the occurrence or impact because uncontrollable factors limited the organization’s 
ability to control the situation. In the 1982 sample, 1.2% of the articles contained diminish 
responses compared to 13% in the current sample. This is not surprising due to the nature of each 
recall crisis. It has been previously established that the 1982 recall was categorized as a victim 
crisis, which would lessen the need for J&J to use the diminish response since no responsibility was 
attributed to the organization. 
 The data also suggests that the same three types of reputation management strategies were 
used most often in both samples in spite of each sample describing the recalls as different types of 
crises. One possible explanation for the same reputation management strategies being used despite 
the varying crisis types is that the organization’s culture may encourage certain types of responses 
more than others. This would not be surprising in organizations like J&J that have longstanding and 
established cultures and procedures that support the use of particular reputation management 
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strategies. It also is possible that the journalists only included certain types of responses that came 
from J&J directly. 
 
 
Research Limitations 
 
 Although the content analysis method was most appropriate for this study because the 
research focused on how media frames could convey information to the public, it also presented a 
challenge for developing and validating the coding scheme. It is likely that the variable reliabilities 
would have been enhanced if coders were not required to analyze latent data using a complex 
coding scheme. However, much media framing research does require the analysis of latent data 
rather than manifest content. It would have been difficult to identify certain variables like overall 
evaluation of J&J and the evaluation of J&J’s reputation by using only manifest content data because 
such data would not have allowed coders to rely on nuances to signal those descriptions either. 
Because perceptions are central to conceptualizations of the media framing process, it is logical that 
coders would need to rely on inferences in identifying ideas. 
  Some of the variables, namely the reputation management strategy, posed a coding 
challenge for the study. The sub-categories within this variable required the coder to choose 
between many strategies based on only a few sentences. The complexity of this task led to the 
decision to collapse the data into the four categories of deny, diminish, rebuild, and reinforce. 
Although this limited the exploration of the subcategories, it probably increased the accuracy of the 
coding by reducing coding errors that could result from the need to make fine-grained distinctions.
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 The sample size and the associated frequency distributions of variables also posed 
limitations to this research. There were only 69 articles in the analysis, 28 articles from the 1982 
sample and 41 from the current sample. The only possible way to increase the size would have been 
to include a wider variety of media publications such as other prestige publications that would be 
likely to cover the recalls. If there was more time and resources, the study may have also been 
strengthened by using cluster samples to describe the coverage from various regions throughout 
the U.S.  
 Another limitation of this research was its reliance on traditional media outlets. Specifically, 
the sample did not include social media outlets that could report on the current crises. The 
inclusion of information provided through various social media outlets could have produced a very 
different data set by possibly evaluating J&J in a different light and reporting different types of 
information that may not have appeared in the traditional newspaper format. 
 Lastly, the current study provides descriptions of news coverage. Thus it is sender-focused 
because it investigates messages that were generated by journalists. While media framing research 
suggests that the media strongly impacts public perception, the present study cannot describe 
public perceptions because it did not evaluate the actual perceptions of people who read the news 
coverage that was analyzed. 
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Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 
 The results of this study contribute to scholarly literature by further supporting the basic 
premises of SCCT using J&J’s 1982 crisis and current crises as case studies. The data supported the 
possible relationship between attribution of responsibility and crisis type by showing that 
evaluations of J&J were more critical regarding the preventable and accident crises than the victim 
crisis. Additionally, the data supported the SCCT idea of performance history by showing that the 
news coverage that did mention a previous recall had more negative evaluations and depictions 
than the coverage that did not mention a previous recall. 
 The current sample also illustrated that the news coverage contained instructing and 
adjusting information more often than it described a reputation management strategy. This could 
suggest that the journalists are more concerned with communicating pertinent information to help 
people cope and know how to behave during a crisis than with serving the organization’s interest 
that might be addressed through conveying a reputation management strategy used by J&J. It is also 
noteworthy that 61% of the coverage did not describe a reputation management strategy, which 
might suggest that the journalists were more apt to include less biased information from third 
parties like the FDA who are likely to be seen as representing the interests of the public. 
  The present study has also presented data surrounding what could be considered an 
extended crisis with the current data set from November 2009 – April 2012. Variables such as the 
evaluation of J&J’s operational response, the description of J&J’s reputation, and the use of 
reputation management strategies could be examined with consideration to the time that the recall 
occurred to see if there was a point in the coverage where the depictions may have changed. 
Although many crises are rather short-term events, like the 1982 recall, some crises like the current 
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J&J recalls and the BP oil spill are noteworthy for the extended time in which they are in the media 
spotlight. Future studies should consider extended crises with consideration for time, to possibly 
suggest a turning point in the news coverage of events. Also, theories and research methods should 
be developed to more comprehensively investigate these extended crises. 
 The data gathered from this study surrounding J&J’s recalls will also offer valuable insight 
to crisis managers who must respond to these exigencies. The present research expands the 
existing literature by providing an in-depth comparison of media coverage of an exemplary crisis 
management effort that garnered positive outcomes for the organization and a different crisis 
where the same organization seems to falter in comparison. Crisis managers may also benefit from 
knowing that the media was not likely to provide an evaluation of J&J’s operational response or 
reputation in either sample. This suggests that it may be possible for organizations to experience 
crises of higher attribution, and still avoid a negative evaluation of their operational response or 
unfavorable mention regarding their reputation. 
 Additionally, crisis managers should consider the possibility that journalists will be less 
inclined to report information that appears to serve organizational interests; and more apt to 
include information that serves the public’s interest. With this consideration, reputation 
management strategies may be employed by the organization, but may not necessarily reach their 
intended publics through newspaper coverage. News releases are a common channel for the 
dissemination of reputation management strategies and they should continue to be used to convey 
information to journalists and the public. However, crisis managers must recognize that the media 
are not obligated to use them as a basis for their coverage of a crisis. 
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Future Research 
 
Future research should devote more attention to several examples of sustained crises that 
occur over an extended period of time as shown by J&J’s current set of recalls. The 1982 recall 
pertained to a fairly restricted situation in contrast to the current crises that are highlighting a 
multitude of problems. An extended view of the crisis management process might add insights into 
variables that hold additional explanatory value. In addition, comparisons could be offered between 
crisis management strategies used in extended versus more restricted crises. 
 Additionally, future research on the J&J case could focus more on the timing of the current 
recalls to see if there was a turning point where the news coverage surrounding J&J’s recalls went 
from favorable to unfavorable. This could further support the SSCT premise of performance history 
by showing if repeated coverage regarding J&J’s recalls could have possibly led to less favorable 
news coverage depictions. Timing could also be used to examine whether or not the use of certain 
reputation management strategies changes as time progressed in both the current sample and the 
1982 coverage. If a study could establish a timeframe that certain reputation management 
strategies were employed, the results might provide an indication of how organizations act and 
respond during various stages of crises. 
 Further examination of J&J’s current crises could also group similar crises together to see if 
there are differences in the reputation management strategies used as well as information-giving 
strategies. This consideration should be made because the nature of J&J’s current crises covers a 
broad spectrum of issues such as moldy odors, faulty hip devices, pills that do not dissolve correctly 
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and inaccurate labels on products to name a few. This study grouped these problems together 
rather than treating them separately. It is possible that a more fine-grained analysis would reveal 
differences in the coverage of the different types of products recalled by J&J. 
 The inclusion of trade publications could also add an interesting perspective on how 
attribution of responsibility may be reported differently to the industry versus the general public. It 
seems likely that crises within a particular industry might be reported differently to a more 
“sympathetic” audience than to the general public. 
 The present study used media framing as a basis for research, so it was appropriate to 
examine news coverage. However, future research could also examine the formal responses that 
are issued directly from the organization to compare whether or not the news coverage is reporting 
the organizational response and stance accurately. This research could involve comparing the 
content of news releases to the content of media coverage of organizational responses. 
 Lastly, the data suggested that newspaper coverage is less likely to include reputation 
management strategies than information giving strategies, which might indicate that they are more 
receptive to information from third parties. Thus future research could examine how third party 
organizations like the FDA express support or fail to support the organization that is experiencing 
the crisis. This research could see if journalists report information from third parties, and if so, 
whether this information seems to support the organization in crisis or vilify it. These issues all 
provide useful considerations for future research investigations. 
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Conclusion 
 
The results of this study have further supported several of the basic premises of SCCT, 
namely the relationship between crisis type and attribution of responsibility and crisis history. The 
information gleaned from this research can inform crisis managers and possibly help them weather 
crisis storms and reduce reputational harm to their organizations. These results could also be a 
basis for communication scholars to address gaps in the literature that that do not speak to crises 
that have occurred over extended periods of time. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF JOHNSON & JOHNSON RECALLS FROM 
NOVEMBER 2009 – APRIL 2012 
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Date  Brand Name  Product Description  Reason/Problem  Company  
12/18/2009 Tylenol   
McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 
Division of McNEIL-PPC, Inc. 
12/09/2010 Rolaids72  Rolaids Soft Chews  
Foreign materials, including 
metal and wood particles 
McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 
Division of McNEIL-PPC, Inc. 
11/29/2010 Mylanta, Alternagel93  
Mylanta and Alternagel 
Liquid Products  
Undeclared alcohol from 
flavoring agents 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck 
Consumer Pharmaceuticals, 
Co. 
11/24/2010 Tylenol101  
Tylenol Cold Liquid 
Products  
Labeling update McNeil Consumer Healthcare 
11/15/2010 Benadryl, Motrin117  
Children's Benadryl, 
Children's Motrin  
Insufficiencies in the 
development of the 
manufacturing process 
McNeil Consumer Healthcare 
11/15/2010 Rolaids120   
Uncharacteristic consistency or 
texture 
McNeil Consumer Healthcare 
10/18/2010 Tylenol 
Over the counter (OTC) 
products, 8 Hour Caplets 
Uncharacteristic smell  McNeil Consumer Healthcare 
07/08/2010 Benadryl; Tylenol; Motrin   
Over the counter (OTC) 
products 
Uncharacteristic smell  McNeil Consumer Healthcare 
06/15/2010 Benadryl; Tylenol 
Over the counter (OTC) 
products   
Uncharacteristic smell  McNeil Consumer Healthcare 
01/15/2010 Motrin, Tylenol, Benedryl, more Drug Products   Off-odor McNeil Consumer Healthcare 
12/21/2011 Motrin 
Motrin IB Coated Tablets 
and Motrin IB Coated 
Caplets 
May not dissolve as quickly as 
intended 
McNeil 
06/28/2011 Tylenol 
TYLENOL, Extra Strength 
Caplets, 225 count   
Uncharacteristic odor McNeil Consumer Healthcare 
06/17/2011 
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Patriot 
Pharmaceuticals, LLC   
RISPERDAL, 3mg tablets 
and risperidone, 2mg 
tablets 
Uncharacteristic odor  
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
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*This list was compiled using a variety of searches on the FDA’s web site. Thus it may not include every recall issued during the specified time 
period.  
 
 
04/14/2011 TOPAMAX® 
TOPAMAX® (topiramate) 100mg 
Tablets 
Uncharacteristic Odor 
Ortho-McNeil 
Neurologics 
Division 
01/14/2011 TYLENOL, BENADRYL, SUDAFED PE 
TYLENOL® 8 Hour, TYLENOL® 
Arthritis Pain, and TYLENOL® 
upper respiratory products, and 
certain lots of BENADRYL®, 
SUDAFED PE®, and SINUTAB® 
Production records found 
instances where equipment 
cleaning procedures were 
insufficient or that cleaning was 
not adequately documented. 
McNeil Consumer 
Healthcare 
02/17/2012 TYLENOL   
Infants TYLENOL Oral 
Suspension, 1 oz. Grape 
difficulty using the Infants TYLENOL 
SimpleMeasure dosing system 
McNeil Consumer 
Healthcare 
01/27/2012 AVEENO® BABY CALMING COMFORT®   Lotion   
The lot exceeded bacterial 
specifications. 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
Consumer 
Companies, Inc. 
03/24/2011 
ASR FEMORAL IMPLANT SIZE 55, 
DEPUY ASR RESURFACING FEMORAL 
HEADS,  
  
Depuy 
Orthopaedics, Inc. 
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APPENDIX C: JOHNSON & JOHNSON SUBSIDIARIES 
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Johnson & Johnson Subsidiaries 
 
**Please note that this list is not comprehensive, but includes most of the subsidiaries 
involved in recalls since December 2009. 
 
 Advanced Sterilization Products 
 Animas Corporation 
 Cordis Corporation 
 DePuy, Inc. 
 DePuy Orthopaedics 
 Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. 
 Ethicon, Inc. 
 Janssen 
 Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. 
 LifeScan, Inc. 
 McNeil Consumer Healthcare 
 McNeil, PPC, Inc. 
 Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
 Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc. 
 Virco BVBA 
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Variable Category 1982 Coverage Current Coverage 
 
Evaluation of 
Operational Response 
Positive 3.6% (n=1) 4.9% (n=2) 
Negative 0%  24.4% (n=10) 
Both Positive and Negative 0%  0%  
No Evaluation 96.4% (n=27) 70.7% (n=29) 
 
Evaluation of 
Reputation 
Favorable 3.5% (n=1) 0%  
Unfavorable 3.5% (n=1) 17% (n=7) 
No Mention 93% (n=26) 83% (n=34) 
 
 
Description of Crisis 
Type 
Victim 35.7% (n=10) 0%  
Accident 0%  24% (n=10) 
Preventable 0%  22% (n=9) 
No Crisis Type Mentioned 64.3% (n=18) 54% (n=22) 
Mention of Previous 
Recalls 
Yes 0% 19.5% (n=8) 
No 100% (n=28) 80.5% (n=33) 
Mention of 1982 Recall Yes N/A 7.3% (n=3) 
No N/A 92.7% (n=38) 
Inclusion of Instructing 
Information 
Yes 32.1% (n=9) 51.2% (n=21) 
No 67.9% (n=19) 48.8% (n=20) 
Inclusion of Adjusting 
Information 
No 60.7% (n=17) 61% (n=25) 
Yes 39.3% (n=11) 39% (n=16) 
Description of 
Reputation 
Management Strategy  
 
 
 
Attack the Accuser 0% 0% 
Denial 0% 10.4% (n=5) 
Scapegoat 0% 6.3% (n=3) 
Suffering 28% (n=5) 0% 
Excuse 0% 6.3% (n=3) 
Deny Volition 0% 0% 
Justification 6% (n=1) 27.1% (n=13) 
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Description of 
Reputation 
Management Strategy 
Continued 
Compensation 39% (n=7) 12.5% (n=6) 
Apology 0% 6.3% (n=3) 
Repentance 6% (n=1) 0% 
Rectification 22% (n=4) 25% (n=12) 
Bolstering 0% 6.3% (n=3) 
Transcendence 0% 0% 
Ingratiation 0% 0% 
 
 
Strategic Response 
Categories 
Deny 27.8% (n=5) 17% (n=8) 
Diminish 56% (n=1) 33% (n=16) 
Rebuild 66.7% (n=12) 43.8% (n=21) 
Reinforce 0% 6.3% (n=3) 
94 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
24/7 Wall St. (2012). The 10 most hated companies in America. Retrieved January 14, 2012, 
from http://247wallst.com/2012/01/13/the-10-most-hated-companies-in-america/  
5 die after taking Tylenol believed to contain cyanide. (1982, October 1). The New York 
Times, pp. 12.  
Agres, T. (2010). Big pharma finds big trouble. Drug Discovery & Development, 13(9), 12-13. 
Ahluwalia, R., Burnkrant, R. E., & Unnava, H. R. (2000). Consumer response to negative 
publicity: The moderating role of commitment. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2), 
203-214. 
Allen, M. W., & Caillouet, R. H. (1994). Legitimation endeavors: Impression management 
strategies used by an organization in crisis. Communication Monographs, 61(1), 44. 
Alsop, R. (2004). The 18 immutable laws of corporate reputation: Creating, protecting, and 
repairing your most valuable asset. New York, NY: Free Press.  
Gerbner, G. (Ed.) (1969). The analysis of communication content; developments in scientific 
theories and computer techniques. New York, NY: Wiley.  
Around the world: Poison pill kills three. (1982, October 1). The Globe and Mail (Canada).  
Baran, S. J., & Davis, D. K. (1995). Mass communication theory : Foundations, ferment, and 
future. Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Publishing Company.  
Barton, L. (2001). Crisis in organizations II. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western College Pub.  
Benoit, W. L. (1997). Image repair discourse and crisis communication. Public Relations 
Review, 23(2), 177-186. doi:10.1016/S0363-8111(97)90023-0  
Benoit, W. L., & Drew, S. (1997). Appropriateness and effectiveness of image repair 
strategies. Communication Reports, 10(2), 153-163.  
95 
 
Benson, J. A. (1988). Crisis revisited: An analysis of strategies used by Tylenol in the second 
tampering episode. Central States Speech Journal, 39(1), 49-66. 
doi:10.1080/10510978809363234  
Berelson, B. (1971). Content analysis in communication research. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.  
Berger, A. A. (1998). Media research techniques (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications.  
Birch, J. (1994). New factors in crisis planning and response. Public Relations Quarterly, 
39(1), 31-34. 
Bloomberg Businessweek (2012). Audience: Where affluence meets influence. Retrieved 
from http://www.bloombergmedia.com/magazine/businessweek/audience/ 
Bond, J., & Kirshenbaum, R. (1998). Under the radar: Talking to today's cynical consumer. 
New York: Wiley.  
Brown, K. A., & White, C. L. (2011). Organization-public relationships and crisis response 
strategies: Impact on attribution of responsibility. Journal of Public Relations Research, 
23(1), 75-92. doi:10.1080/1062726X.2010.504792  
Bruce, T., Hovden, J., & Markula, P. (2010). Sportswomen at the Olympics: A global content 
analysis of newspaper coverage. Rotterdam ; Boston: Sense.  
Business digest. (1982, December 25). New York Times, pp. 29.  
Cable, D. M., & Turban, D. B. (2003). The value of organizational reputation in the 
recruitment context: A brand-equity perspective. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 
33(11), 2244-2266. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2003.tb01883.x  
Carroll, C. (Ed.). (2010). Corporate reputation and the news media: Agenda-setting within 
business news coverage in developed, emerging, and frontier markets. New York, NY: 
Routledge.  
Casey, T. Johnson & Johnson updates its 1943 credo for 21st century CSR program. Retrieved 
January 20, 2012, from http://www.triplepundit.com/2011/07/johnson-johnson-csr-
healthy-future/  
Chokkavelu, A. (2012). The obvious buys in the stock market. Retrieved January 24, 2011, 
from http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2012/01/22/the-obvious-buys-in-the-
stock-market.aspx  
96 
 
Citizens Commission on Human Rights International. J&J paid Texas official to speak around 
the U.S., jury told. Retrieved January 24, 2012, from http://www.cchrint.org/tag/jj/  
Claeys, A., Cauberghe, V., & Vyncke, P. (2010). Restoring reputations in times of crisis: An 
experimental study of the situational crisis communication theory and the moderating 
effects of locus of control. Public Relations Review, 36(3), 256-262. 
doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2010.05.004  
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, 
N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.  
Cook, F. L., Tyler, T. R., Goetz, E. G., Gordon, M. T., Protess, D., Leff, D. R., & Molotch, H. L. 
(1983). Media and agenda setting: Effects on the public, interest group leaders, policy 
makers, and policy. Public Opinion Quarterly, 47(1), 16. 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. (2002). Helping crisis managers protect reputational assets 
initial tests of the situational crisis communication theory. Management 
Communication Quarterly, 16(2), 162-185. doi:10.1177/089331802237233  
Coombs, W. T. (1999). Information and compassion in crisis responses: A test of their 
effects. Journal of Public Relations Research, 11(2), 125.  
Coombs, W. T. (2004). Impact of past crises on current crisis communication. Journal of 
Business Communication, 41(3), 265-289. doi:10.1177/0021943604265607  
Coombs, W. T. (2006). The protective powers of crisis response strategies: Managing 
reputational assets during a crisis. Journal of Promotion Management, 12(3), 241-260. 
doi:10.1300/J057v12n03•13  
Coombs, W. T. (2012). Ongoing crisis communication: Planning, managing, and responding 
(3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE.  
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (1996). Communication and attributions in a crisis: An 
experiment study in crisis communication. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(4), 
279-295. 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2001). An extended examination of the crisis situations: A 
fusion of the relational management and symbolic approaches. Journal of Public 
Relations Research, 13(4), 321-340. doi:10.1207/S1532754XJPRR1304_03  
Coombs, W. T. (1995). Choosing the right words. Management Communication Quarterly, 
8(4), 447-476. doi:10.1177/0893318995008004003  
97 
 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. (2010). Crisis communication and its allied fields. The 
handbook of crisis communication (pp. 54-64) Wiley-Blackwell. 
doi:10.1002/9781444314885.ch2  
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2002). Helping crisis managers protect reputational assets. 
Management Communication Quarterly, 16(2), 165-186. 
doi:10.1177/089331802237233  
Deacon, D. (1999). Researching communications: A practical guide to methods in media and 
cultural analysis. London : New York: Oxford University Press.  
Dean, D. H. (2004). Consumer reaction to negative publicity. Journal of Business 
Communication, 41(2), 192-211. doi:10.1177/0021943603261748  
DeCicco, G. (1988). A public relations primer. American Antiquity, 53(4), pp. 840-856.  
Dennis, E. E., & Merrill, J. C. (1996). Media debates: Issues in mass communication. White 
Plains, NY: Longman.  
Dowdell, T. D., Govindaraj, S., & Jain, P. C. (1992). The Tylenol incident, ensuing regulation, 
and stock prices. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 27(02), 283. 
doi:10.2307/2331372  
Dutta, S., & Pullig, C. (2011). Effectiveness of corporate responses to brand crises: The role 
of crisis type and response strategies. Journal of Business Research, 64(12), 1281-1287. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.01.013  
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of 
Communication, 43(4), 51-58. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x  
Firemen discovered first link between cyanide deaths and Tylenol. (1982, October 1). The 
Associated Press  
Fisk, M. C., Freeley, J. & Voreacos, D. (2012). J&J said to agree to pay $1 billion in Risperdal 
marketing probe. Retrieved January 24, 2012, from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-05/j-j-to-agree-to-1b-accord-in-
risperdal-probe.html  
Flame Index. (2012). Johnson & Johnson. Retrieved January 24, 2012, 2012, from 
http://www.flameindex.com/company/Johnson__Johnson  
98 
 
Flowers, J. F., Haynes, A. A., & Crespin, M. H. (2003). The media, the campaign, and the 
message. American Journal of Political Science, 47(2), 259-273. doi:10.1111/1540-
5907.00018  
Fombrun, C., & Shanley, M. (1990). What's in a name? Reputation building and corporate 
strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 33(2), 233-258. doi:10.2307/256324  
Food and Drug Administration. Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 years. Retrieved 
September 21, 2011, from 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/CentennialofFDA/CentennialEdi
tionof FDAConsumer/ucm093787.htm  
Food and Drug Administration. (2011). FDA, Justice Department Take Action Against 
McNeil-PPC inc. Retrieved March 10, 2011, from 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm246685.htm  
Freeman, D. W. (2011, June 29). Tylenol recalled again over musty smell. CBS News.  
Freimuth, V. S., & Van Nevel, J. P. (1981). Reaching the public: The asbestos awareness 
campaign. Journal of Communication, 31(2), 155-167. doi:10.1111/j.1460-
2466.1981.tb01238.x  
Gam. (1982, October 1). AROUND THE WORLD poisoned pills kill three. The Globe and Mail 
(Canada),  
Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1987). The changing culture of affirmative action. In R. G. 
Braungart, & M. M. Braungart (Eds.), Research in Political Sociology (pp. 137-177). 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.  
Gandy, O. H., Grant, A. E., & Reese, S. D. (2001). Framing public life: Perspectives on media 
and our understanding of the social world. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Garramone, G. M., Atkin, C. K., Pinkleton, B. E., & Cole, R. T. (1990). Effects of negative 
political advertising on the political process. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic 
Media, 34(3), 299-311.  
Gibson, D. C. (1995). Public relations considerations of consumer product recall. Public 
Relations Review, 21(3), 225-240. doi:10.1016/0363-8111(95)90023-3  
Goggins, C. (2010). Testimony before the house committee on oversight and government 
reform: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, US House of 
Representatives.  
99 
 
Gray, E. R., & Balmer, J. M. T. (1998). Managing corporate image and corporate reputation. 
Long Range Planning, 31(5), 695-702. doi:10.1016/S0024-6301(98)00074-0  
Hinds, M. D. (1982, October 6, 1982). Tylenol maker recalls capsules after Strychnine 
incident in west. New York Times, pp. 1.  
Holladay, S. J. (2009). Crisis communication strategies in the media coverage of chemical 
accidents. Journal of Public Relations Research, 21(2), 208-217. 
doi:10.1080/10627260802557548  
Hsieh, H., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. 
Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277-1288. doi:10.1177/1049732305276687  
Huang, Y., Su, S., & Lin, Y. (2005). Crisis communicative strategies: Category, continuum, and 
application. New York, NY: International Communication Association.  
Huang, Y. (2008). Trust and relational commitment in corporate crises: The effects of crisis 
communicative strategy and form of crisis response. Journal of Public Relations 
Research, 20(3), 297-327. doi:10.1080/10627260801962830  
Iles, P., & Mabey, C. (1994). Managing Learning. London ; New York: Routledge in 
association with the Open University.  
Jarrell, G., & Peltzman, S. (1985). The impact of product recalls on the wealth of sellers. 
Journal of Political Economy, 93(3), 512.  
Jin, Y. (2010). Making sense sensibly in crisis communication: How publics' crisis 
appraisals influence their negative emotions, coping strategy preferences, and crisis 
response acceptance. Communication Research, 37(4), 522-552. 
doi:10.1177/0093650210368256  
Johnson & Johnson. (2011). McNeil-PPC, Inc. Announces Signing of Consent DecreeCovering 
Manufacturing Facilities in Las Piedras, PR, Fort Washington, PA, and Lancaster, PA. 
Retrieved, 2011, from http://www.jnj.com/connect/news/all/mcneil-ppc-inc-
announces-signing-of-consent-decree-covering-manufacturing-facilities-in-las-
piedras-pr-fort-washington-pa-and-lancaster-pa  
Kavilanz, P. (2010). Johnson & Johnson's drug problem: Behind the 'phantom recall' of Motrin. 
Retrieved, 2010, from 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/02/news/companies/mcneil_motrin_phantom_recall
/index.htm  
100 
 
Kennedy, J. F. (1962). Special message to the congress on protecting the consumer interest. 
Retrieved September 25, 2011, from 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9108#axzz1YhMhtPEw  
Kepplinger, H. M., & Glaab, S. (2007). Research note: Reciprocal effects of negative press 
reports. European Journal of Communication, 22(3), 337-354. 
doi:10.1177/0267323107079685  
Kim, S., Avery, E. J., & Lariscy, R. W. (2009). Are crisis communicators practicing what we 
preach?: An evaluation of crisis response strategy analyzed in public relations research 
from 1991 to 2009. Public Relations Review, 35(4), 446-448. 
doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2009.08.002  
Kotler, P. (1972). What consumerism means for marketers. Harvard Business Review, 50(3), 
48-57.  
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content analysis : An introduction to its methodology (2nd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage. Retrieved from 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0658/2003014200-d.html  
Lampman, R. J., & Douthitt, R. A. (1997). The consumer bill of rights thirty-five years later. 
Advancing the Consumer Interest, 9(2), 4.  
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical 
data. Biometrics, 33(1), pp. 159-174.  
Lewin, T. (1982, December 25). Tylenol posts an apparent recovery. New York Times, pp. 
30.  
Liodakis, G. (2005). The new stage of capitalist development and the prospects of 
globalization. Science & Society, 69(3), 341-366.  
Ma, R. (2005). Media, crisis, and SARS: An introduction. Asian Journal of Communication, 
15(3), 241-246. doi:10.1080/01292980500260656  
Marsh, T. L., Schroeder, T. C., & Mintert, J. (2004). Impacts of meat product recalls on 
consumer demand in the USA. Applied Economics, 36(9), 897-909. 
doi:10.1080/0003684042000233113  
McFadden, R. D. (1982, October 2). Poison deaths bring U.S. warning on Tylenol use. The 
New York Times, pp. 1.  
101 
 
McQuail, D. (1994). Mass communication theory : An introduction (3rd ed.). London ; 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.  
Miller, G. (2011, July 26). For J & J / McNeil , no exec blame for recalls , panel says. 
FiercePharma Manufacturing. Retrieved November 2, 2011, from 
http://www.fiercepharmamanufacturing.com/story/jjmcneil-no-exec-blame-recalls-
panel-says/2011-07-26 
Mizerski, R. W. (1982). An attribution explanation of the disproportionate influence of 
unfavorable information. Journal of Consumer Research, 9(3), 301-310.  
Nakra, P. (2000). Corporate reputation management: "CRM" with a strategic twist? Public 
Relations Quarterly, 45(2), 35-42.  
Neff, J. (2010). What's ailing J&J--and why isn't its rep hurting? Advertising Age, 81(19), 4-
25.  
Neff, J. (2011). Can J&J's brand family stage recall recovery? Advertising Age, 82(21), 1-21.  
Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). The content analysis guidebook. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage 
Publications.  
New York Times (2011). Media kit: Newspaper. Retrieved February 15, 2012, from 
http://nytmarketing.whsites.net/mediakit/newspaper  
Newsom, D., Carrell, B., & Newsom, B. (1986). Writing in public relations practice, Public 
relations writing: Form & style (2nd. ed.). Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Pub. Co.  
Newton, M. 1. (2006). The encyclopedia of serial killers (2nd ed.). New York: Checkmark 
Books.  
North, R. C. (1963). Content analysis; a handbook with applications for the study of 
international crisis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.  
OTC production woes at J&J plant delay products return, impact sales. (2011, September). 
The Food and Drug Letter.  
Pace, K.M., Fediuk, T.A., & Botero, I.C. (2010). The acceptance of responsibility and 
expressions of regret in organizational apologies after a transgression. Corporate 
Communications: An International Journal, 15(4), 410-427. 
Page, G., & Fearn, H. (2005). Corporate reputation: What do consumers really care about? 
Journal of Advertising Research, 45(3), 305-313. 
102 
 
Pauly, J. J., & Hutchison, L. L. (2005). Moral fables of public relations practice: The Tylenol 
and Exxon Valdez cases. Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 20(4), 231-249. 
doi:10.1207/s15327728jmme2004_2  
Pienciak, R. T. (1982, October 2). All 7 victims took fatal dose on Wednesday. The 
Associated Press  
Potter, W. J., & Levine‐Donnerstein, D. (1999). Rethinking validity and reliability in content 
analysis. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 27(3), 258-284. 
doi:10.1080/00909889909365539  
Pullig, C., Netemeyer, R. G., & Biswas, A. (2006). Attitude basis, certainty, and challenge 
alignment: A case of negative brand publicity. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 34(4), 528-542.  
Recalling FDA-regulated products: The Subcommittee on Regulations and Healthcare, 
House Committee on Small Business, (2009).  
Riffe, D., Fico, F., & Lacy, S. 1. (1998). Analyzing media messages: Using quantitative content 
analysis in research. Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum.  
Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of Communication, 
49(1), 103.  
Seeger, M. W., Sellnow, T. L., & Ulmer, R. R. (2003). Communication and organizational crisis. 
Westport, Conn: Praeger.  
Seon-Kyoung An, Gower, K. K., & Cho, S. H. (2011). Level of crisis responsibility and crisis 
response strategies of the media. Journal of Communication Management, 15(1), 70-83. 
doi:10.1108/13632541111105268  
Siebel, C., & Smith, K. C. (2009). How public are we? coverage of sociology by the associated 
press . The American Sociologist, 40(4), 289-308. doi:10.1007/s12108-009-9075-0  
Silverman, E. (2011). J&J to settle criminal charge over Risperdal marketing, while 40 states 
plan lawsuits. Retrieved January 24, 2012, 2012, from 
http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/08/jj-to-settle-criminal-charge-over-risperdal-
marketing-while-40-states-plan-lawsuit/ 
Silverman, E. (2012). After the Risperdal trial, J&J looks more like humpty-dumpty. Retrieved 
January 24, 2012, from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/edsilverman/2012/01/20/after-the-risperdal-trial-jj-
looks-more-like-humpty-dumpty/  
103 
 
Society of Professional Journalists.SPJ Code of Ethics. Retrieved from 
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp  
Souiden, N., & Pons, F. (2009). Product recall crisis management: The impact on 
manufacturer's image, consumer loyalty and purchase intention. Journal of Product & 
Brand Management, 18(2), 106-114. doi:10.1108/10610420910949004  
Sturges, D. L. (1994). Communicating through crisis. Management Communication 
Quarterly, 7(3), 297-316. doi:10.1177/0893318994007003004  
Sturges, D. L., Carrell, B. J., Newsom, D. A., & Barrera, M. (1991). Crisis communication 
management: The public opinion node and its relationship to environmental nimbus. 
SAM Advanced Management Journal (07497075), 56(3), 22.  
Sun, S., & Fan, X. (2010). Effect size reporting practices in communication research. 
Communication Methods and Measures, 4(4), 331-340. 
doi:10.1080/19312458.2010.527875  
Tankard, J. W. (2001). The empirical approach to the study of media framing. In O. H. 
Gandy, A. E. Grant & S. D. Reese (Eds.), Framing public life: Perspectives on media and 
our understanding of the social world (pp. 95-105). Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.  
Taylor, L. (2012). Novartis tops patient groups "reputation table". Retrieved January 24, 
2012, from http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/12-01-
18/Novartis_tops_patient_groups_reputation_table.aspx  
Tucker, L., & Melewar, T. C. (2005). Corporate reputation and crisis management: The 
threat and manageability of anti-corporatism. Corporate Reputation Review, 7(4), 377-
387.  
Tybout, A. M., Bobby J. Calder, & Sternthal, B. (1981). Using information processing theory 
to design marketing strategies. Journal of Marketing Research, 18(1), pp. 73-79.  
Tylenol's "miracle" comeback. (1983). Time, 122(17), 79.  
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. (2011). Regulatory Procedures Manual. Washington, 
DC: US Government Printing Office.  
Valentini, C., & Romenti, S. (2011). The press and Alitalia's 2008 crisis: Issues, tones, and 
frames. Public Relations Review, 37(4), 360-365. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2011.07.002  
104 
 
van Hoye, G., & Lievens, F. (2005). Recruitment-related information sources and 
organizational attractiveness: Can something be done about negative publicity? 
International Journal of Selection & Assessment, 13(3), 179-187. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
2389.2005.00313.x  
Voreacos, D., Nussbaum, A., & Farrell, G. (2011). Johnson & Johnson. Business Week, (4223), 
64-71.  
Walters, L. M., & Walters, T. N. (1992). Environment of confidence: Daily newspaper use of 
press releases. Public Relations Review, 18(1), 31-46. doi:10.1016/0363-
8111(92)90019-U  
Weick, K. E. (1988). Enacted sensemaking in crisis situations. Journal of Management 
Studies, 25(4), 305-317.  
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sense Making in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
Inc.  
Weldon, W. (2010). Testimony before the house committee on oversight and government 
reform: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of 
Representatives, 2010th (2010).  
Wigley, S., & Fontenot, M. (2011). The Giffords shootings in Tucson: Exploring citizen-
generated versus news media content in crisis management. Public Relations Review, 
37(4), 337-344. doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2011.07.004  
Wyatt, R. O., & Badger, D. P. (1984). How reviews affect interest in and evaluation of films. 
Journalism Quarterly, 61(4), 874-878.  
Xie, Y., & Peng, S. (2009). How to repair customer trust after negative publicity: The roles of 
competence, integrity, benevolence, and forgiveness. Psychology & Marketing, 26(7), 572-
589.  
